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Capital values in use versus replacement costs: Theory and Canadian evidence

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  • DANIEL B. THORNTON

Abstract

. This paper explores relationships between capital values in use (market values, which include “goodwill†, or abnormal growth opportunities) and capital replacement costs for the 52 publicly traded Canadian firms that disclosed such data in 1983 and 1984. Tobin's Q is one at the margin and regresses toward one over time, as predicted by economic theory, but differs across industries: Q†ratios of manufacturers average one; those of resource firms exceed one, probably reflecting Ricardian rents; those of utilities are less than one, possibly due to regulatory constraints. Q†ratios based on replacement cost data cannot be accurately estimated from historic cost accounting data. Replacement cost data may contain random measurement error but evidently not bias. Thus the data may be especially useful for assessing the performance of portfolios of firms, in which random error will be diversified away. Cross sectional regression analyses indicate that Canadian accounting procedures overstate shareholders' equity and understate bondholders' equity in replacement costs. Thus some financial ratios based on replacement cost data (e.g., leverage) are biased. Evidence on how deferred taxes are reflected in security prices is ambiguous. Implications of the findings for accounting standard setters, researchers and users of financial statements are discussed. Résumé. L'auteur explore les relations entre les valeurs en capital utilisées (les valeurs marchandes comprenant l'«achalandage» ou les possibilités de croissance inusitées) et les coûts de remplacement de capital pour les 52 entreprises canadiennes inscrites à la bourse qui ont livré ce genre de données en 1983 et 1984. L'indice Q de Tobin est de un à la marge et régresse vers un dans le temps, comme le prévoit la théorie économique, mais il diffère selon les secteurs: les indices Q des entreprises manufacturières sont de un en moyenne; ceux des entreprises d'extraction de ressources excèdent un, ce qui reflète probablement les rentes ricardiennes; et ceux des services pubics sont inférieurs à un, possiblement en raison des contraintes de la réglementation. Les indices Q basés sur les données relatives au coût de remplacement ne peuvent être estimés avec exactitude à partir des données comptables relatives aux coûts d'origine. Les données relatives au coût de remplacement peuvent contenir une erreur de mesure aléatoire mais, bien sûr, aucun biais. Ces données peuvent donc être particulièrement utiles dans l'évaluation du rendement des portefeuilles des sociétés, dans laquelle l'erreur aléatoire sera diluée. Les analyses de régression intersectorielles révèlent que les procédés comptables canadiens surestiment l'avoir des actionnaires et sous†estiment l'avoir des détenteurs d'obligations en coûts de remplacement. Par conséquent, certains ratios financiers basés sur les données relatives au coût de remplacement (l'effet de levier financier par exemple) sont biaisés. La façon dont les impôts reportés sont reflétés dans le prix des titres est ambiguë. L'auteur traite des conséquences des résultats de cette étude pour les resposables de l'établissement des normes comptables, les chercheurs et les utilisateurs des états financiers.

Suggested Citation

  • Daniel B. Thornton, 1988. "Capital values in use versus replacement costs: Theory and Canadian evidence," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 5(1), pages 343-370, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:wly:coacre:v:5:y:1988:i:1:p:343-370
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1911-3846.1988.tb00709.x
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    1. Jean Bédard & Daniel B. Thornton, 1992. "J.R. Hanna, D.B. Kennedy, and G.D. Richardson, Reporting the Effects of Changing Prices: A Review of the Experience with Section 4510 (Toronto: Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants Research Rep," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 9(1), pages 356-363, September.

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