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Déjà Vu: The Effect of Executives and Directors with Prior Banking Crisis Experience on Bank Outcomes around the Global Financial Crisis

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  • Anwer S. Ahmed
  • Brant E. Christensen
  • Adam J. Olson
  • Christopher G. Yust

Abstract

We investigate the effect of executives and directors with prior banking crisis experience on bank outcomes around the global financial crisis (GFC). Executives and directors with previous experience leading banks through a bank crisis may have been uniquely able to understand the risks, recognize the warnings signs early, and thus respond more effectively to the GFC. Controlling for other executive, director, and bank‐level characteristics, we examine whether bank performance, risk taking, and accounting quality in the period immediately before and during the GFC are affected by having executives or directors who previously served as bank executives or directors during the 1980s/1990s banking crisis (80s/90s crisis). Overall, we find that banks led by these crisis‐experienced executives and directors exhibit stronger performance, lower risk taking, and higher accounting quality in the period around the GFC. These effects are strongest among bank leaders for whom the 80s/90s crisis was most salient. Results are robust to propensity‐matched samples and other analyses performed to rule out alternative explanations. Our results suggest these individuals were able to learn from prior crisis experience. Incidence, sur les résultats bancaires, de l'expérience de la précédente crise bancaire vécue par les dirigeants et les administrateurs sous la crise financière mondiale Les auteurs s'intéressent à l'incidence, sur les résultats bancaires, de l'expérience de la précédente crise du secteur bancaire vécue par les dirigeants et les administrateurs sous la crise financière mondiale. Les dirigeants et les administrateurs ayant préalablement mené des banques à travers la crise bancaire pourraient avoir ainsi acquis une aptitude exceptionnelle à comprendre les risques, à reconnaître précocement les signaux d'alarme et, par conséquent, à réagir de manière plus efficace à la crise financière mondiale. Contrôlant les autres caractéristiques des dirigeants, des administrateurs et des banques elles‐mêmes, les auteurs se demandent si la performance bancaire, la prise de risques et la qualité de la comptabilité durant la crise financière internationale et la période l'ayant précédée sont influencées par la présence de dirigeants ou d'administrateurs qui ont auparavant occupé des postes de dirigeants ou d'administrateurs de banques au cours de la crise bancaire des années 1980 et 1990. Globalement, les auteurs constatent que les banques gérées par des dirigeants et des administrateurs ayant vécu l'expérience de la crise affichent une meilleure performance, prennent moins de risques et ont une comptabilité de qualité supérieure sous la crise financière mondiale. Ces caractéristiques sont plus marquées dans le cas de dirigeants de banques davantage frappés par la crise des années 1980 et 1990. Les résultats de l’étude résistent au rapprochement des échantillons selon le coefficient de propension et à diverses analyses visant à exclure d'autres explications. Ils semblent indiquer que ceux qui ont préalablement vécu cette expérience de crise ont été en mesure d'en tirer des leçons.

Suggested Citation

  • Anwer S. Ahmed & Brant E. Christensen & Adam J. Olson & Christopher G. Yust, 2019. "Déjà Vu: The Effect of Executives and Directors with Prior Banking Crisis Experience on Bank Outcomes around the Global Financial Crisis," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 36(2), pages 958-998, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:wly:coacre:v:36:y:2019:i:2:p:958-998
    DOI: 10.1111/1911-3846.12462
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    1. Kenneth R. French & Martin N. Baily & John Y. Campbell & John H. Cochrane & Douglas W. Diamond & Darrell Duffie & Anil K Kashyap & Frederic S. Mishkin & Raghuram G. Rajan & David S. Scharfstein & Robe, 2010. "The Squam Lake Report: Fixing the Financial System," Economics Books, Princeton University Press, edition 1, number 9261.
    2. Benjamin E. Hermalin & Michael S. Weisbach, 2003. "Boards of directors as an endogenously determined institution: a survey of the economic literature," Economic Policy Review, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, vol. 9(Apr), pages 7-26.
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    1. Thomas R. Kubick & Yijun Li & John R. Robinson, 2020. "Tax-savvy executives," Review of Accounting Studies, Springer, vol. 25(4), pages 1301-1343, December.
    2. Christopher Hoag, 2019. "Bank Executive Experience in a Financial Crisis," Working Papers 1902, Trinity College, Department of Economics.
    3. Zhao, Jing & Cao, June & Huang, Jingchang, 2023. "CEO/board medical background and stock returns during the COVID-19 pandemic," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 127(C).
    4. Christopher Hoag, 2019. "Bank Executive Experience with Clearinghouse Loan Certificates," Working Papers 1903, Trinity College, Department of Economics.

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