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Campaign Learning and Vote Determinants

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  • David A. M. Peterson

Abstract

How campaigns shape voters' decisions is central to the study of political behavior. The basic conclusion is simple: campaigns matter. While we know who campaigns influence, there is no clear empirical evidence of why or how campaigns matter. This comes from two things. First, despite different theories about campaigns, the existing studies measure the campaign as a function of time. Second, these studies ignore the individual‐level psychological mediators of these effects. We know that there are differences across time during a campaign, but we do not know how or why. In this article I suggest that campaigns work by altering voters' uncertainty about the candidates and combine aggregate and individual‐level data using a hierarchical logit estimated via Markov chain Monte Carlo methods. I find that voters change how they weigh their attitudes during the campaign because of changes in their uncertainty about the candidates.

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  • David A. M. Peterson, 2009. "Campaign Learning and Vote Determinants," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 53(2), pages 445-460, April.
  • Handle: RePEc:wly:amposc:v:53:y:2009:i:2:p:445-460
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-5907.2009.00380.x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Shepsle, Kenneth A., 1972. "The Strategy of Ambiguity: Uncertainty and Electoral Competition," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 66(2), pages 555-568, June.
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    5. Gelman, Andrew & King, Gary, 1993. "Why Are American Presidential Election Campaign Polls So Variable When Votes Are So Predictable?," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 23(4), pages 409-451, October.
    6. Franklin, Charles H., 1991. "Eschewing Obfuscation? Campaigns and the Perception of U.S. Senate Incumbents," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 85(4), pages 1193-1214, December.
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    Cited by:

    1. Prato, Carlo & Wolton, Stephane, 2014. "Electoral Imbalances and their Consequences," MPRA Paper 68650, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 26 Nov 2015.
    2. Horacio A Larreguy & John Marshall & James M SnyderJr, 2018. "Leveling the playing field: How campaign advertising can help non-dominant parties," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 16(6), pages 1812-1849.

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