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Land Tenure Choice in Chinese Villages: The Rational versus the Political Model

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  • Yang Yao

Abstract

The rational and political decision models are developed and tested for the land tenure choice in rural China. A novelty of the test is to link the collective decision with general relative factor scarcities. Competing hypotheses are developed for the two models and tested with panel data collected on 83 Chinese villages. The results show that neither model is strongly rejected although the political model fares slightly better in more sophisticated econometric testing. This suggests that popular political participation is emerging in Chinese villages. Implications of this finding to Chinese land policy are discussed.

Suggested Citation

  • Yang Yao, 2004. "Land Tenure Choice in Chinese Villages: The Rational versus the Political Model," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 80(4).
    • Handle: RePEc:uwp:landec:v:80:y:2004:i:4:p477-489
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    Cited by:

    1. Wang, Xiaobing & Yu, Xiaohua, 2011. "Scale Effects, Technical Efficiency and Land Lease in China," 2011 International Congress, August 30-September 2, 2011, Zurich, Switzerland 115736, European Association of Agricultural Economists.
    2. Jia, Lili, 2012. "Land fragmentation and off-farm labor supply in China," Studies on the Agricultural and Food Sector in Transition Economies, Leibniz Institute of Agricultural Development in Transition Economies (IAMO), volume 66, number 66.
    3. Che, Yi, 2009. "Mismatch: land reallocations, recovery land rental and land rental market development in rural China," MPRA Paper 39794, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    4. Jia, Lili & Petrick, Martin, 2011. "How land fragmentation affects off-farm labor supply in China: Evidence from household panel data," 51st Annual Conference, Halle, Germany, September 28-30, 2011 114522, German Association of Agricultural Economists (GEWISOLA).
    5. Jia, Xiangping & Piotrowski, Stephan, 2006. "Land property, tenure security and credit access: a historical perspective of change processes in China," Research in Development Economics and Policy (Discussion Paper Series) 9083, Universitaet Hohenheim, Department of Agricultural Economics and Social Sciences in the Tropics and Subtropics.
    6. Ying Bai & James Kung & Yang Zhao, 2014. "How Much Expropriation Hazard Is Too Much? The Effect of Land Reallocation on Organic Fertilizer Usage in Rural China," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 90(3), pages 434-457.
    7. Zhao, Xiaoxue, 2020. "Land and labor allocation under communal tenure: Theory and evidence from China," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 147(C).

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • O12 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Microeconomic Analyses of Economic Development
    • P32 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Socialist Institutions and Their Transitions - - - Collectives; Communes; Agricultural Institutions

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