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Surprise! Out-of-Network Billing for Emergency Care in the United States

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  • Zack Cooper
  • Fiona Scott Morton
  • Nathan Shekita

Abstract

In the United States, hospitals and physicians independently negotiate contracts with insurers. Therefore, a privately insured individual can be treated at an in-network hospital’s emergency department but receive a large unexpected bill from an out-of-network emergency physician working at that facility. Because patients do not choose their emergency physician, emergency physicians can remain out of network and charge high prices without losing patient volume. We illustrate that this strong outside option improves physicians’ bargaining power with insurers. We conclude by analyzing New York’s efforts to address out-of-network billing through binding arbitration between physicians and insurers over out-of-network payments. This intervention reduced out-of-network billing by 12.8 percentage points (88%).

Suggested Citation

  • Zack Cooper & Fiona Scott Morton & Nathan Shekita, 2020. "Surprise! Out-of-Network Billing for Emergency Care in the United States," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 128(9), pages 3626-3677.
  • Handle: RePEc:ucp:jpolec:doi:10.1086/708819
    DOI: 10.1086/708819
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Zack Cooper & Stuart V Craig & Martin Gaynor & John Van Reenen, 2019. "The Price Ain’t Right? Hospital Prices and Health Spending on the Privately Insured," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 134(1), pages 51-107.
    2. David C. Chan, Jr., 2015. "The Efficiency of Slacking Off: Evidence from the Emergency Department," NBER Working Papers 21002, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Wilson, Michael & Cutler, David M., 2014. "Emergency Department Profits Are Likely To Continue As The Affordable Care Act Expands Coverage," Scholarly Articles 33471113, Harvard University Department of Economics.
    4. Jeffrey Clemens & Joshua D. Gottlieb & Tímea Laura Molnár, 2015. "The Anatomy of Physician Payments: Contracting Subject to Complexity," NBER Working Papers 21642, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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    Cited by:

    1. Martin Gaynor & Kate Ho & Robert J. Town, 2015. "The Industrial Organization of Health-Care Markets," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 53(2), pages 235-284, June.
    2. Keith Marzilli Ericson & Justin Sydnor, 2017. "The Questionable Value of Having a Choice of Levels of Health Insurance Coverage," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 31(4), pages 51-72, Fall.
    3. Ambar La Forgia, 2023. "The Impact of Management on Clinical Performance: Evidence from Physician Practice Management Companies," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 69(8), pages 4646-4667, August.
    4. Farmer, Amy & Pecorino, Paul, 2022. "Discovery in a screening model of final offer arbitration," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(C).
    5. Daria Pelech, 2018. "An Analysis of Private-Sector Prices for Physicians’ Services: Working Paper 2018-01," Working Papers 53441, Congressional Budget Office.
    6. Steven Berry & Martin Gaynor & Fiona Scott Morton, 2019. "Do Increasing Markups Matter? Lessons from Empirical Industrial Organization," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 33(3), pages 44-68, Summer.
    7. Neely, Megan Tobias & Carmichael, Donna, 2021. "Profiting on crisis: how predatory financial investors have worsened inequality in the coronavirus crisis," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 112697, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    8. Atul Gupta & Sabrina T Howell & Constantine Yannelis & Abhinav Gupta, 2021. "Does Private Equity Investment in Healthcare Benefit Patients? Evidence from Nursing Homes," Working Papers 2021-20, Becker Friedman Institute for Research In Economics.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • I11 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Analysis of Health Care Markets
    • I13 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Health Insurance, Public and Private
    • I18 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health
    • L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation

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