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Corporate Governance In Various Transition Economies


  • DIBRA, Rezart


Corporate governance refers to the system by which corporations are directed and controlled. The governance structure specifies the distribution of rights and responsibilities among different participants in the corporation (such as the board of directors, managers, shareholders, creditors, auditors, regulators, and other stakeholders) and specifies the rules and procedures for making decisions in corporate affairs (from Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia). Corporate governance issues are especially important in transition economies, since these countries do not have the long-established financial institution infrastructure to deal with corporate governance issues. Before the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union, there was no need to discuss corporate governance issues because all enterprises were owned by the state and there were no shareholders. All that has changed since 1989. This paper discusses the view on corporate governance in some transition economies. Corporate governance has come to the forefront of academic research due to the vital role it plays in the overall health of economic systems. The development of a strong corporate governance framework is important to protect stakeholders, maintain investor confidence in the transition countries and attract foreign direct investment.

Suggested Citation

  • DIBRA, Rezart, 2013. "Corporate Governance In Various Transition Economies," Academica Science Journal, Economica Series, Dimitrie Cantemir University, Faculty of Economical Science, vol. 2(3), pages 21-33, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:tig:journl:v:2:y:2013:i:3:p:21-33

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    1. repec:hrv:faseco:30728046 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William H., 1976. "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 305-360, October.
    3. Marco Herpen & Mirjam Praag & Kees Cools, 2005. "The Effects of Performance Measurement and Compensation on Motivation: An Empirical Study," De Economist, Springer, vol. 153(3), pages 303-329, September.
    4. Tor Eriksson, 2005. "Managerial pay and executive turnover in the Czech and Slovak Republics ," The Economics of Transition, The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, vol. 13(4), pages 659-677, October.
    5. Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1997. " A Survey of Corporate Governance," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 52(2), pages 737-783, June.
    6. Fama, Eugene F & Jensen, Michael C, 1983. "Separation of Ownership and Control," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 26(2), pages 301-325, June.
    7. Luca Enriques & Paolo Volpin, 2007. "Corporate Governance Reforms in Continental Europe," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 21(1), pages 117-140, Winter.
    8. Fama, Eugene F, 1980. "Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 88(2), pages 288-307, April.
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