The transition of the electricity system towards decarbonization: the need for change in the market regime

The mainstream community of energy experts is not aware of the long-term impacts that carbon policies directly concerned with promoting the development of low-carbon technologies produce on the electricity market regime. Long-term market coordination should be replaced by public coordination with long-term arrangements. The current market coordination makes carbon pricing ineffective in orienting investors towards capital-intensive low-carbon technologies. Fossil fuel generation technologies are preferred because their investment risks are much lower in the market regime, even with a high but unstable carbon price. Thus, in order to avoid delaying investment that is aimed at the decarbonization of the electricity system, a number of new market arrangements that lower the investment risk of low-carbon technologies and provide output-based subsidization have or are being selected by governments. As the use of low-carbon equipment to produce electricity develops, long-term market coordination for other technologies (e.g. peaking units, combined cycle gas turbine) will fade away because they alter the market price setting. Thus it is likely that, in the future, public coordination and planning will replace the decisions of market players not only for low-carbon technologies but also for every other type of capacity development. Policy relevance The development of renewables as promoted by both feed-in tariffs and green certificate obligations, which answer to different market failures, is well known. Similar long-term arrangements, which both subsidize and de-risk low-carbon investments for every small-sized and large-sized technology, shift learning costs and risks onto consumers. Energy experts and regulators have ignored that the expansion and generalization of these arrangements are changing the coordination function of the electricity markets. Apart from those in the UK, they are still unaware of the impacts that such technology-focused policies produce on the electricity market regime. The transition from market coordination to public coordination, which is inconsistent with the market principles of European electricity legislation, and long-term contracting is inevitable and should be anticipated.