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When is privatization better facilitated? Global evidence from the telecom sector

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  • Sang Lee
  • Shakil Quayes

Abstract

This paper attempts to identify the telecom-sector performance indicators, relevant economic variables, and institutional characteristics of a country that affect the process of privatization of state-owned telecom enterprises. Using standard duration analysis of a panel data, it is demonstrated that the privatization incentives are not only shaped by a country's fiscal conditions but are also influenced by the degree of competitiveness of private sector participation in policy-making process. The empirical results also reveal the significant impact of efficiency in telecom service provision on its course to privatization.

Suggested Citation

  • Sang Lee & Shakil Quayes, 2005. "When is privatization better facilitated? Global evidence from the telecom sector," Global Economic Review, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 34(1), pages 119-127.
  • Handle: RePEc:taf:glecrv:v:34:y:2005:i:1:p:119-127
    DOI: 10.1080/1226508042000328971
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, 1993. "A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262121743, January.
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    Cited by:

    1. Hsu, Su-Ying & Lo, Chu-Ping & Wu, Shih-Jye, 2014. "The nexus of market concentration and privatization policy in mixed oligopoly," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 38(C), pages 196-203.

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