Gender-Based Advantage: A Model of Emerging and Constructed Opportunities
This paper seeks to analyze the emergence of gender-based differential advantage in an abstract evolutionary model. This model helps to explain how the social convention of favoring one gender in the distribution of household surplus could emerge over time and suggests that gender-based advantage could emerge in a society without purposeful intent. It also provides insights into intra-household gender relations and the possible effects of reference groups on intra-household relations. In addition, it lays the groundwork for some interesting empirical or experimental research.
Volume (Year): 8 (2002)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
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