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Measurement, incentives and constraintsin Stigler's economics of science

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  • Arthur Diamond

Abstract

George J. Stigler's seminal role as one of the founders of the economics of science is summarized and evaluated. His main contribution rests in his asking an array of important questions and arguing persuasively for the application of empirical, and especially statistical, techniques to the answering of those questions. He asks whether and how science progresses; whether a scientist's biography is important in understanding his science; what characteristics of a scientist are most complementary to success in science; and how the professionalization of science redirects the attention of scientists more toward internal puzzle-solving, and less toward applied relevance.

Suggested Citation

  • Arthur Diamond, 2005. "Measurement, incentives and constraintsin Stigler's economics of science," The European Journal of the History of Economic Thought, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 12(4), pages 635-661.
    • Handle: RePEc:taf:eujhet:v:12:y:2005:i:4:p:635-661
    DOI: 10.1080/09672560500370292
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Gary S. Becker & William M. Landes, 1974. "Essays in the Economics of Crime and Punishment," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number beck74-1.
    2. David M. Blank & George J. Stigler, 1957. "The Demand and Supply of Scientific Personnel," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number blan57-1.
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    Cited by:

    1. Marek Loužek, 2012. "Ekonomie vědy - naděje, nebo léčka? [Economics of Science - A Hope or a Pitfall?]," Politická ekonomie, Prague University of Economics and Business, vol. 2012(4), pages 536-550.
    2. Henrik Egbert & Teodor Sedlarski & Aleksandar B. Todorov, 2022. "Foundations of contemporary economics: George Stigler and the Chicago school of economics – on price theory and information economics," Economic Thought journal, Bulgarian Academy of Sciences - Economic Research Institute, issue 4, pages 452-472.
    3. James Dalton & Louis Esposito, 2011. "Standard Oil and Predatory Pricing: Myth Paralleling Fact," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 38(3), pages 245-266, May.
    4. Richie Aggarwal & Ompal Singh & Adarsh Anand & P. K. Kapur, 2019. "Modeling innovation adoption incorporating time lag between awareness and adoption process," International Journal of System Assurance Engineering and Management, Springer;The Society for Reliability, Engineering Quality and Operations Management (SREQOM),India, and Division of Operation and Maintenance, Lulea University of Technology, Sweden, vol. 10(1), pages 83-90, February.
    5. Hazhir Rahmandad & Keyvan Vakili, 2019. "Explaining Heterogeneity in the Organization of Scientific Work," Organization Science, INFORMS, vol. 30(6), pages 1125-1145, November.

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