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Meritocracy Voting: Measuring the Unmeasurable

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  • Peter C. B. Phillips

Abstract

Learned societies commonly carry out selection processes to add new fellows to an existing fellowship. Criteria vary across societies but are typically based on subjective judgments concerning the merit of individuals who are nominated for fellowships. These subjective assessments may be made by existing fellows as they vote in elections to determine the new fellows or they may be decided by a selection committee of fellows and officers of the society who determine merit after reviewing nominations and written assessments. Human judgment inevitably plays a central role in these determinations and, notwithstanding its limitations, is usually regarded as being a necessary ingredient in making an overall assessment of qualifications for fellowship. The present article suggests a mechanism by which these merit assessments may be complemented with a quantitative rule that incorporates both subjective and objective elements. The goal of "measuring merit" may be elusive, but quantitative assessment rules can help to widen the effective electorate (for instance, by including the decisions of editors, the judgments of independent referees, and received opinion about research) and mitigate distortions that can arise from cluster effects, invisible college coalition voting, and inner sanctum bias. The rule considered here is designed to assist the selection process by explicitly taking into account subjective assessments of individual candidates for election as well as direct quantitative measures of quality obtained from bibliometric data. Audit methods are suggested to mitigate possible gaming effects by electors in the peer review process. The methodology has application to a wide arena of quality assessment and professional ranking exercises. Some specific issues of implementation are discussed in the context of the Econometric Society fellowship elections.

Suggested Citation

  • Peter C. B. Phillips, 2016. "Meritocracy Voting: Measuring the Unmeasurable," Econometric Reviews, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 35(1), pages 2-40, January.
  • Handle: RePEc:taf:emetrv:v:35:y:2016:i:1:p:2-40
    DOI: 10.1080/07474938.2014.956633
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Bjerkholt, Olav, 2015. "Trygve Haavelmo At The Cowles Commission," Econometric Theory, Cambridge University Press, vol. 31(1), pages 1-84, February.
    2. Roberts, Kevin, 2015. "Dynamic voting in clubs," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(3), pages 320-335.
    3. Olav Bjerkholt (ed.), 1995. "Foundations of Modern Econometrics," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, volume 0, number 46.
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    Cited by:

    1. Schoenfeld, Jordan, 2017. "The effect of voluntary disclosure on stock liquidity: New evidence from index funds," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 63(1), pages 51-74.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • A14 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics - - - Sociology of Economics
    • Z13 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology; Language; Social and Economic Stratification
    • C18 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods and Methodology: General - - - Methodolical Issues: General

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