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Public Safety And The Moral Dilemma In The Defense Against Terror

Author

Listed:
  • Raphaël Franck
  • Arye Hillman
  • Miriam Krausz

Abstract

The economic theory of defense has traditionally described public safety as achieved through investments that deter adversaries. Deterrence is, however, ineffective and pre-emptive defense is required when a population of intended victims confronts supreme-value suicide terror. A moral dilemma then arises, since pre-emption may impose collective punishment, while in the absence of pre-emption the population of intended victims is exposed to acts of terror. We consider how a population of intended terror victims confronts the moral dilemma, and compare the threatened population's response with the public-safety recommendations of external judges who are not personally affected by the threat of terror.

Suggested Citation

  • Raphaël Franck & Arye Hillman & Miriam Krausz, 2005. "Public Safety And The Moral Dilemma In The Defense Against Terror," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 16(5), pages 347-364.
    • Handle: RePEc:taf:defpea:v:16:y:2005:i:5:p:347-364
    DOI: 10.1080/10242690500207399
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Arye L. Hillman, 2004. "Nietzschean Development Failures," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 119(3_4), pages 263-280, June.
    2. B. Peter Rosendorff & Todd Sandler, 2004. "Too Much of a Good Thing?," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 48(5), pages 657-671, October.
    3. Ben-Yashar, Ruth & Nitzan, Shmuel, 2001. "Investment Criteria in Single and Multi-member Economic Organizations," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 109(1-2), pages 1-13, October.
    4. Bernholz, Peter, 2004. "Supreme values as the basis for terror," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 20(2), pages 317-333, June.
    5. James Yetman, 2004. "Suicidal Terrorism And Discriminatory Screening: An Efficiency-Equity Trade-Off," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 15(3), pages 221-230.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Jan Schnellenbach, 2006. "Appeasing nihilists? Some economic thoughts on reducing terrorist activity," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 129(3), pages 301-313, December.
    2. Arye Hillman & Niklas Potrafke, 2015. "The UN Goldstone Report and retraction: an empirical investigation," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 163(3), pages 247-266, June.
    3. Arye Hillman, 2007. "Economic and security consequences of supreme values," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 131(3), pages 259-280, June.
    4. Hillman, Arye L., 2010. "Expressive behavior in economics and politics," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 26(4), pages 403-418, December.
    5. Arye Hillman, 2011. "Expressive voting and identity: evidence from a case study of a group of U.S. voters," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 148(1), pages 249-257, July.
    6. Bozzoli, Carlos & Müller, Cathérine, 2011. "Perceptions and attitudes following a terrorist shock: Evidence from the UK," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 27(S1), pages 89-106.
    7. Kollias, Christos & Messis, Petros & Mylonidis, Nikolaos & Paleologou, Suzanna-Maria, 2009. "Terrorism and the effectiveness of security spending in Greece: Policy implications of some empirical findings," Journal of Policy Modeling, Elsevier, vol. 31(5), pages 788-802, September.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Defense economics; Defensive pre-emption; Counter-terrorism; Terror; International judges; Profiling;

    JEL classification:

    • D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
    • H56 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - National Security and War

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