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Why is there so much Peace?

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  • Peter Stauvermann

Abstract

In this paper we change the structure of the basic conflict model. This makes it possible to found an economic theory of war and peace. Apart from few exceptions there exist no peace equilibria in the related literature of conflict theory. The aim of the paper is to fill this gap, because most parts of the world live in peace. Further we show that negotiations are possible to avoid a war. The main result is that war breaks out only if the distribution of resources and/or the effectiveness of weapons is sufficiently unequal.

Suggested Citation

  • Peter Stauvermann, 2002. "Why is there so much Peace?," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 13(1), pages 61-75.
    • Handle: RePEc:taf:defpea:v:13:y:2002:i:1:p:61-75
    DOI: 10.1080/10242690210965
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Helmut Bester & Karl Warneryd, "undated". "Conflict Resolution under Asymmetric Information," Papers 006, Departmental Working Papers.
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    Cited by:

    1. Yang-Ming Chang & Joel Potter & Shane Sanders, 2007. "The Fate Of Disputed Territories: An Economic Analysis," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 18(2), pages 183-200.
    2. Raul Caruso, 2006. "A Trade Institution as a Peaceful Institution? A Contribution to Integrative Theory," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 23(1), pages 53-72, February.
    3. Stauvermann Peter J., 2012. "Accumulation and Growth in the Shadow of Conflicts," Peace Economics, Peace Science, and Public Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 18(1), pages 1-30, April.

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