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Better weapons or better troops?

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  • Jonathan Lipow
  • Eli Feinerman

Abstract

Many observers of Israel's defense resource allocation process believe that insufficient resources are devoted to troop quality, while excessive resources are devoted to weapon quality. In this paper, we offer a potential explanation for this phenomenon. In our example, officers seek to signal their ability through their budgeting choices. Signaling behavior, combined with the timing and informational structure of defense decision-making, results in a sub-optimal allocation of resources to training and troop quality.

Suggested Citation

  • Jonathan Lipow & Eli Feinerman, 2001. "Better weapons or better troops?," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 12(4), pages 271-284.
    • Handle: RePEc:taf:defpea:v:12:y:2001:i:4:p:271-284
    DOI: 10.1080/10430710108404988
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. In-Koo Cho & David M. Kreps, 1987. "Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 102(2), pages 179-221.
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    Cited by:

    1. Jonathan Lipow & Yakir Plessner, 2008. "Tax Efficiency And Quality/Quantity Trade-Offs In Defense Procurement," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 19(1), pages 21-26.

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