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Jokowi's First Year: A Weak President Caught between Reform and Oligarchic Politics

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  • Burhanuddin Muhtadi

Abstract

When President Joko Widodo (Jokowi) took office in October 2014, he promised to usher in a new style of politics, generating optimism among many Indonesians that his government would enthusiastically promote reform. Yet Jokowi has since placed greater value on realpolitik than on reform, as evidenced by his choice of cabinet members, his response to the controversy surrounding senior police officer Budi Gunawan, and his handling of attempts by the police and others to weaken Indonesia's respected Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK). This article shows that Jokowi failed to deliver on his promises of reform largely owing to a combination of personal and external factors. He failed to show leadership on anticorruption and human-rights issues, for example--in part because he prefers economic development over democratic reform, but also because he is not immune to the oligarchic politics that dominate Indonesia's political life and promote the interests of Indonesia's elite.

Suggested Citation

  • Burhanuddin Muhtadi, 2015. "Jokowi's First Year: A Weak President Caught between Reform and Oligarchic Politics," Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 51(3), pages 349-368, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:taf:bindes:v:51:y:2015:i:3:p:349-368
    DOI: 10.1080/00074918.2015.1110684
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Groseclose, Tim & Snyder, James M., 1996. "Buying Supermajorities," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 90(2), pages 303-315, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Andi Andi & Anang Sujoko & Wawan Sobari, 2021. "Oligarchical Populism; The Analysis of President Joko Widodo's Political Communication," Technium Social Sciences Journal, Technium Science, vol. 21(1), pages 446-458, July.
    2. Xu, Tao Louie, 2024. "The Road Not Taken? Industrial Policy and Political Settlements in China and Indonesia 1990–2022," MPRA Paper 122669, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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