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Committees under qualified majority rules: the one-core stability index

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  • Joseph Armel Momo Kenfack

    (The University of Cergy Pontoise (THEMA))

Abstract

A policy proposal introduced by a committee member is either adopted or abandoned in favor of a new proposal after lengthy deliberations. If a proposal is abandoned, the committee member who introduced it does not cooperate in any effort to replace it. For a player, not cooperate means to vote against a proposal when the rule identifies him or her as one of those who are entitled to make a decision. The one-core is a solution concept that captures that idea. It is never empty if the committee has less than five individuals, but might be empty if there are five or more individuals. I identify a necessary and sufficient condition for the non-emptiness of the one-core no matter the number of alternatives, the preference profile or the number of players in a committee game, under any qualified majority rule.

Suggested Citation

  • Joseph Armel Momo Kenfack, 2022. "Committees under qualified majority rules: the one-core stability index," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 59(2), pages 401-422, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:59:y:2022:i:2:d:10.1007_s00355-022-01388-5
    DOI: 10.1007/s00355-022-01388-5
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Kumabe, Masahiro & Mihara, H. Reiju, 2011. "Preference aggregation theory without acyclicity: The core without majority dissatisfaction," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 72(1), pages 187-201, May.
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    5. Momo Kenfack, Joseph Armel & Pongou, Roland & Tchantcho, Bertrand, 2014. "The stability of decision making in committees: The one-core," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 122(3), pages 390-395.
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