On the positive association of parliamentary social choice functions
Intuitively, a voting rule satisfies the condition of positive association if it guarantees that an improvement for an alternative in the preferences expressed by voters results in a change, if there is any, of the social status of that alternative in the same direction. In this article, we consider two interpretations of this notion, and for parliamentary voting procedures, we provide results showing under the impartial anonymous culture (IAC) hypothesis how often the positive association is (not) satisfied. Furthermore, our analysis also permits us to investigate the relationships between these notions.
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Volume (Year): 35 (2010)
Issue (Month): 1 (June)
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- Peleg,Bezalel, 2008. "Game Theoretic Analysis of Voting in Committees," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521074650, May.
- Muller, Eitan & Satterthwaite, Mark A., 1977. "The equivalence of strong positive association and strategy-proofness," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 14(2), pages 412-418, April.
- Wilson, Mark C. & Pritchard, Geoffrey, 2007. "Probability calculations under the IAC hypothesis," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 54(3), pages 244-256, December.
- Pierre Favardin & Dominique Lepelley, 2006.
"Some Further Results on the Manipulability of Social Choice Rules,"
Social Choice and Welfare,
Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 26(3), pages 485-509, June.
- Pierre Favardin & Dominique Lepelley, 2006. "Some Further Results on the Manipulability of Social Choice Rules," Post-Print halshs-00068839, HAL.
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