Finessing a point: augmenting the core
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DOI: 10.1007/s00355-009-0391-7
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References listed on IDEAS
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"Structural instability of the core,"
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- Tataru, Maria, 1999. "Growth rates in multidimensional spatial voting," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 37(3), pages 253-263, May.
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