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Liberal political equality implies proportional representation

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  • Eliora Hout
  • Anthony McGann

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  • Eliora Hout & Anthony McGann, 2009. "Liberal political equality implies proportional representation," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 33(4), pages 617-627, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:33:y:2009:i:4:p:617-627
    DOI: 10.1007/s00355-009-0382-8
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Peyton Young, 1995. "Optimal Voting Rules," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 9(1), pages 51-64, Winter.
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    Cited by:

    1. Mario Daniele Amore & Margherita Corina, 2021. "Political elections and corporate investment: International evidence," Journal of International Business Studies, Palgrave Macmillan;Academy of International Business, vol. 52(9), pages 1775-1796, December.
    2. Stefan Wintein & Conrad Heilmann, 2022. "Liberal political equality does not imply proportional representation," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 59(1), pages 63-91, July.

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