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Appointing high-court judges by political parties

Author

Listed:
  • Nicolás Porteiro
  • Antonio Villar

    ()

Abstract

This paper proposes a mechanism to overcome the possibility that political parties may block the nomination of High-Court judges when the Parliament is involved in their nomination and their mandate expires on a fixed date. This possibility arises when the default option is that the judge whose mandate expires holds office until an agreement is reached. Our proposal consists of changing the default option by a weighted lottery, related to the shares in Parliament of the different parties. We show that this mechanism is capable of solving the problem under reasonable conditions and implementing a politically balanced solution. Copyright The Author(s) 2015

Suggested Citation

  • Nicolás Porteiro & Antonio Villar, 2015. "Appointing high-court judges by political parties," SERIEs: Journal of the Spanish Economic Association, Springer;Spanish Economic Association, vol. 6(1), pages 91-99, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:series:v:6:y:2015:i:1:p:91-99
    DOI: 10.1007/s13209-014-0118-6
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s13209-014-0118-6
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1982. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(1), pages 97-109, January.
    2. Nicolás Porteiro, 2007. "An Efficient and Egalitarian Negotiation Procedure for Economies with Externalities," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 28(1), pages 19-40, January.
    3. repec:cup:apsrev:v:83:y:1989:i:04:p:1181-1206_08 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Banks, Jeffrey S. & Duggan, John, 2006. "A General Bargaining Model of Legislative Policy-making," Quarterly Journal of Political Science, now publishers, vol. 1(1), pages 49-85, January.
    5. Tymofiy Mylovanov & Andriy Zapechelnyuk, 2013. "Optimal Arbitration," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 54, pages 769-785, August.
    6. Cardona, Daniel & Ponsati, Clara, 2011. "Uniqueness of stationary equilibria in bargaining one-dimensional policies under (super) majority rules," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 73(1), pages 65-75, September.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Negotiation; Political competition; Random protocols; Legislative bargaining; D72;

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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