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Strategy-proof voting rules on a multidimensional policy space for a continuum of voters with elliptic preferences

  • Hans Peters

    ()

  • Souvik Roy

    ()

  • Ton Storcken

    ()

We consider voting rules on a multidimensional policy space for a continuum of voters with elliptic preferences. Assuming continuity, y-strategy-proofness - meaning that coalitions of size smaller or equal to a small number y cannot manipulate - and unanimity, we show that such rules are decomposable into one-dimensional rules. Requiring, additionally, anonymity leads to an impossibility result. The paper can be seen as an extension of the model of Border and Jordan (1983) to a continuum of voters. Contrary, however, to their finite case where single voters are atoms, in our model with nonatomic voters even a small amount of strategy-proofness leads to an impossibility.

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s13209-011-0048-5
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Article provided by Spanish Economic Association in its journal SERIEs.

Volume (Year): 2 (2011)
Issue (Month): 4 (December)
Pages: 485-496

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Handle: RePEc:spr:series:v:2:y:2011:i:4:p:485-496
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  1. Border, Kim C & Jordan, J S, 1983. "Straightforward Elections, Unanimity and Phantom Voters," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 50(1), pages 153-70, January.
  2. Stefan Maus & Hans Peters & Ton Storcken, 2006. "Strategy-proof voting for single issues and cabinets," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 126(1), pages 27-43, January.
  3. Salvador Barberà & Dolors Berga & Bernardo Moreno, 2009. "Individual versus group strategy proofedness: when do they coincide?," Working Papers 372, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
  4. Salvador Barberà & Dolors Berga & Bernardo Moreno, 2012. "Group strategy-proof social choice functions with binary ranges and arbitrary domains: characterization results," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 41(4), pages 791-808, November.
  5. Yves Sprumont, 1995. "Strategyproof Collective Choice in Economic and Political Environments," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 28(1), pages 68-107, February.
  6. Zhou, Lin, 1991. "Impossibility of Strategy-Proof Mechanisms in Economies with Pure Public Goods," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 58(1), pages 107-19, January.
  7. H. Moulin, 1980. "On strategy-proofness and single peakedness," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 35(4), pages 437-455, January.
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