Pareto efficiency in the jungle
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References listed on IDEAS
- Michele Piccione & Ariel Rubinstein, 2007. "Equilibrium in the Jungle," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 117(522), pages 883-896, July.
- Emanuela Randon & Peter Simmons, 2017. "A top dog tale with preference complementarities," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 120(1), pages 47-63, January.
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KeywordsPower; Coercion; Jungle economy; Pareto efficiency; Gift giving; Trade;
- D51 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Exchange and Production Economies
- D61 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
- P52 - Economic Systems - - Comparative Economic Systems - - - Comparative Studies of Particular Economies
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