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Outsider- und Insider-Systeme der Corporate Governance

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  • Patrick Velte
  • Stefan Weber

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  • Patrick Velte & Stefan Weber, 2011. "Outsider- und Insider-Systeme der Corporate Governance," Metrika: International Journal for Theoretical and Applied Statistics, Springer, vol. 21(4), pages 473-482, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:metrik:v:21:y:2011:i:4:p:473-482
    DOI: 10.1007/s00187-010-0109-0
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. La Porta, Rafael & Lopez-de-Silanes, Florencio & Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert, 2000. "Investor protection and corporate governance," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(1-2), pages 3-27.
    2. Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1997. "A Survey of Corporate Governance," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 52(2), pages 737-783, June.
    3. Reinhard H. Schmidt & Gerald Spindler, 2002. "Path Dependence, Corporate Governance and Complementarity," International Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 5(3), pages 311-333, November.
    4. Franks, Julian & Mayer, Colin, 2001. "Ownership and Control of German Corporations," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 14(4), pages 943-977.
    5. Schmidt, Reinhard H & Spindler, Gerald, 2002. "Path Dependence, Corporate Governance and Complementarity," International Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 5(3), pages 311-333, Winter.
    6. Gorton, Gary & Schmid, Frank A., 2000. "Universal banking and the performance of German firms," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(1-2), pages 29-80.
    7. Michael Adams, 1999. "Cross Holdings in Germany," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 155(1), pages 1-80, March.
    8. Barclay, Michael J & Holderness, Clifford G, 1992. "The Law and Large-Block Trades," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 35(2), pages 265-294, October.
    9. Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, 1980. "Takeover Bids, the Free-Rider Problem, and the Theory of the Corporation," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 11(1), pages 42-64, Spring.
    10. Andrew L. Friedman & Samantha Miles, 2002. "Developing Stakeholder Theory," Journal of Management Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 39(1), pages 1-21, January.
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    Cited by:

    1. Jörn Obermann, 2020. "Let’s talk about money! Assessing the link between firm performance and voluntary Say-on-Pay votes," Journal of Business Economics, Springer, vol. 90(1), pages 109-135, February.
    2. Esther Pittroff, 2016. "Whistle-blowing regulation in different corporate governance systems: an analysis of the regulation approaches from the view of path dependence theory," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 20(4), pages 703-727, December.

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