Revisiting the tenancy-inefficiency question with an inter-temporal optimisation framework: insights from the agrarian set-up of Assam Plains in Eastern India
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DOI: 10.1007/s40847-018-0067-1
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Cited by:
- Paltasingh, Kirtti Ranjan & Basantaray, Amit Kumar & Jena, Pabitra Kumar, 2022. "Land tenure security and farm efficiency in Indian agriculture: Revisiting an old debate," Land Use Policy, Elsevier, vol. 114(C).
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More about this item
Keywords
Tenancy; Sharecropper; Fixed-rent tenant; Owner operator; Efficiency/inefficiency;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- Q - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics
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