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Power in the multinational corporation in industry equilibrium

  • Dalia Marin
  • Thierry Verdier

    ()

Recent theories of the multinational corporation introduce the property rights model of the firm and examine whether to integrate our outsource firm activities locally or to a foreign country. This paper focus instead on the internal organization of the multinational corporation by examining the power allocation between headquarters and subsidiaries. We provide a framework to analyse the interaction between the decision to serve the local market by exporting or FDI, market access and the optimal mode of organization of the multinational corporation. We find that subsidiary managers are given most autonomy in their decision how to run the firm at intermediate levels of local competition. We then provide comparative statistics for changes in fixed FDI entry costs and trade costs, information technology, the number of local competitors, and in the size of the local market.

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s00199-007-0327-3
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Article provided by Springer in its journal Economic Theory.

Volume (Year): 38 (2009)
Issue (Month): 3 (March)
Pages: 437-464

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Handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:38:y:2009:i:3:p:437-464
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  1. Claudio Campanale & Rui Castro & Gian Luca Clementi, 2007. "Asset Pricing in a Production Economy with Chew-Dekel Preferences," Working Papers 07-13, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
  2. Dixit, Avinash K & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1975. "Monopolistic Competition and Optimum Product Diversity," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 64, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
  3. Philippe Aghion & Jean Tirole, 1994. "Formal and Real Authority in Organizations," Working papers 95-8, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  4. Marc J. Melitz & Gianmarco I.P. Ottaviano, 2005. "Market Size, Trade, and Productivity," NBER Working Papers 11393, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  5. Marin, Dalia & Verdier, Thierry, 2007. "Competing in Organizations: Firm Heterogeneity and International Trade," CEPR Discussion Papers 6342, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  6. Marin, Dalia & Verdier, Thierry, 2002. "Power Inside the Firm and the Market: a General Equilibrium Approach," CEPR Discussion Papers 3526, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  7. Marin, Dalia, 2005. "A New International Division of Labor in Europe: Outsourcing and Offshoring to Eastern Europe," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 80, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
  8. Grossman, Sanford J & Hart, Oliver D, 1986. "The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(4), pages 691-719, August.
  9. Esteban Rossi-Hansberg & Pol Antras & Luis Garicano, 2005. "Offshoring in a Knowledge Economy," 2005 Meeting Papers 196, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  10. repec:hrv:faseco:4784029 is not listed on IDEAS
  11. Oliver Hart & John Moore, 1988. "Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm," Working papers 495, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  12. Marin, Dalia & Verdier, Thierry, 2002. "Globalization and the 'New Enterprise'," CEPR Discussion Papers 3640, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  13. Puga, Diego & Trefler, Daniel, 2005. "Wake Up and Smell the Ginseng: The Rise of Incremental Innovation in Low-Wage Countries," CEPR Discussion Papers 5286, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  14. Ottaviano, Gianmarco & Turrini, Alessandro Antonio, 2003. "Distance and FDI When Contracts are Incomplete," CEPR Discussion Papers 4041, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  15. repec:hrv:faseco:4784031 is not listed on IDEAS
  16. Antràs, Pol & Helpman, Elhanan, 2004. "Global Sourcing," CEPR Discussion Papers 4170, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  17. Gene M. Grossman & Esteban Rossi-Hansberg, 2008. "Trading Tasks: A Simple Theory of Offshoring," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(5), pages 1978-97, December.
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