IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/spr/grdene/v33y2024i1d10.1007_s10726-023-09857-7.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Collaborative Dishonesty with Unequal Profits - an Experimental Investigation

Author

Listed:
  • Beatrice Braut

    (University of Genoa
    University of Turin Corso Unione Sovietica)

  • Nives Della Valle

    (European Commission, Joint Research Centre (JRC)
    University of Trento)

  • Marco Piovesan

    (University of Verona)

Abstract

Our experiment explores the impact of asymmetric incentives on collaboration within a context where participants can coordinate and potentially engage in deceptive practices to secure financial gains. We contrast two scenarios: one in which cooperation results in an equal distribution of gains, and another where the distribution is unequal. Our investigation focuses on the dynamics of collaborative behavior over time and digs into individual strategies employed by participants. We find that corruptive collaboration persists when its gains are unequally divided. Over time, participants acquire experience in collaborative tactics, often utilizing their reports to covert signals. Notably, participants coordinate around compromise distributions that yield smaller payments, suggesting that this context may actually reduce the perceived cost of dishonesty.

Suggested Citation

  • Beatrice Braut & Nives Della Valle & Marco Piovesan, 2024. "Collaborative Dishonesty with Unequal Profits - an Experimental Investigation," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 33(1), pages 147-157, February.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:grdene:v:33:y:2024:i:1:d:10.1007_s10726-023-09857-7
    DOI: 10.1007/s10726-023-09857-7
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s10726-023-09857-7
    File Function: Abstract
    Download Restriction: Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1007/s10726-023-09857-7?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Johannes Abeler & Daniele Nosenzo & Collin Raymond, 2019. "Preferences for Truth‐Telling," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 87(4), pages 1115-1153, July.
    2. Martin G. Kocher & Simeon Schudy & Lisa Spantig, 2018. "I Lie? We Lie! Why? Experimental Evidence on a Dishonesty Shift in Groups," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 64(9), pages 3995-4008, September.
    3. Klimm, Felix, 2019. "Suspicious success – Cheating, inequality acceptance, and political preferences," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 117(C), pages 36-55.
    4. Muehlheusser, Gerd & Roider, Andreas & Wallmeier, Niklas, 2015. "Gender differences in honesty: Groups versus individuals," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 128(C), pages 25-29.
    5. Conrads, Julian & Irlenbusch, Bernd & Rilke, Rainer Michael & Walkowitz, Gari, 2013. "Lying and team incentives," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 34(C), pages 1-7.
    6. Václav Korbel, 2017. "Do we lie in groups? An experimental evidence," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 24(15), pages 1107-1111, September.
    7. Greiner, Ben, 2004. "An Online Recruitment System for Economic Experiments," MPRA Paper 13513, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    8. Urs Fischbacher, 2007. "z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 10(2), pages 171-178, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Fochmann, Martin & Fochmann, Nadja & Kocher, Martin G. & Müller, Nadja, 2021. "Dishonesty and risk-taking: Compliance decisions of individuals and groups," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 185(C), pages 250-286.
    2. Chadi, Adrian & Homolka, Konstantin, 2022. "Little Lies and Blind Eyes – Experimental Evidence on Cheating and Task Performance in Work Groups," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 199(C), pages 122-159.
    3. Castillo, Geoffrey & Choo, Lawrence & Grimm, Veronika, 2022. "Are groups always more dishonest than individuals? The case of salient negative externalities," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 198(C), pages 598-611.
    4. Lohse, Tim & Simon, Sven A., 2021. "Compliance in teams – Implications of joint decisions and shared consequences," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 94(C).
    5. Shuguang Jiang & Marie Claire Villeval, 2024. "Dishonesty as a collective‐risk social dilemma," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 62(1), pages 223-241, January.
    6. Battiston, Pietro & Gamba, Simona & Rizzolli, Matteo & Rotondi, Valentina, 2021. "Lies have long legs cheating, peer scrutiny and loyalty in teams," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 94(C).
    7. Dufwenberg, Martin & Dufwenberg, Martin A., 2018. "Lies in disguise – A theoretical analysis of cheating," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 175(C), pages 248-264.
    8. Benistant, Julien & Galeotti, Fabio & Villeval, Marie Claire, 2021. "The Distinct Impact of Information and Incentives on Cheating," IZA Discussion Papers 14014, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    9. Feess, Eberhard & Schilling, Thomas & Timofeyev, Yuriy, 2023. "Misreporting in teams with individual decision making: The impact of information and communication," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 209(C), pages 509-532.
    10. Behnk, Sascha & Hao, Li & Reuben, Ernesto, 2022. "Shifting normative beliefs: On why groups behave more antisocially than individuals," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 145(C).
    11. Dato, Simon & Feess, Eberhard & Nieken, Petra, 2019. "Lying and reciprocity," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 118(C), pages 193-218.
    12. Johannes Abeler & Daniele Nosenzo & Collin Raymond, 2019. "Preferences for Truth‐Telling," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 87(4), pages 1115-1153, July.
    13. Grosch, Kerstin & Rau, Holger A., 2017. "Gender differences in honesty: The role of social value orientation," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 62(C), pages 258-267.
    14. Castillo, Geoffrey & Choo, Lawrence & Grimm, Veronika, 2020. "Are groups really more dishonest than individuals?," FAU Discussion Papers in Economics 01/2020, Friedrich-Alexander University Erlangen-Nuremberg, Institute for Economics, revised 2020.
    15. Heike Hennig‐Schmidt & Hendrik Jürges & Daniel Wiesen, 2019. "Dishonesty in health care practice: A behavioral experiment on upcoding in neonatology," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 28(3), pages 319-338, March.
    16. Florian Engl, 2020. "Ideological Motivation and Group Decision-Making," CESifo Working Paper Series 8742, CESifo.
    17. Soraperra, Ivan & Weisel, Ori & Zultan, Ro’i & Kochavi, Sys & Leib, Margarita & Shalev, Hadar & Shalvi, Shaul, 2017. "The bad consequences of teamwork," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 160(C), pages 12-15.
    18. Michalis Drouvelis & Martin G. Kocher, 2021. "Cheating in Labour Markets," CESifo Working Paper Series 8942, CESifo.
    19. Muehlheusser, Gerd & Promann, Timo & Roider, Andreas & Wallmeier, Niklas, 2024. "Honesty of Groups: Effects of Size and Gender Composition," IZA Discussion Papers 16954, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    20. Astrid Dannenberg & Elina Khachatryan, 2020. "A Comparison of Individual and Group Behavior in a Competition with Cheating Opportunities," MAGKS Papers on Economics 202003, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:grdene:v:33:y:2024:i:1:d:10.1007_s10726-023-09857-7. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.