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Optimizing market supervision mechanisms for online grocery shopping with consideration of malicious consumer behavior defense

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  • Yaning Miao

    (Lanzhou University of Technology)

  • Yuchun Zhang

    (Lanzhou University of Technology)

Abstract

In recent years, online grocery shopping (OGS) has greatly expanded the consumer scene, effectively meeting the daily needs of residents. All kinds of OGS platforms and platforms stationed merchants as well as consumer groups are increasing daily. With the continuous expansion of the market size, the difficulties of market supervision are also growing. The current development of OGS has appeared in the malicious rights of consumers, the sale of counterfeit and shoddy goods by sellers, the untrustworthiness of OGS platforms, and the inefficient supervision of market regulatory agencies, which have seriously affected the standardization and efficient operation of the market, and damaged the credibility of government regulatory departments. Given the above problems, this paper explores the optimization path of the regulatory mechanism for the self-regulatory development of the OGS market as the goal. We combined evolutionary game theory and system dynamics to carry out the simulation analysis, and the final results show that the current regulatory mechanism is not conducive to the development of the OGS market self-regulatory development; hierarchical supervision, dynamic supervision, and additional rewards and penalties for the combination of the three modes of regulation can significantly improve the overall OGS market regulatory efficiency. Therefore, government regulators should take the initiative to implement hierarchical management in the process of market supervision of OGS platforms and give OGS platforms full and independent rights to rewards and penalties to give the platform enterprise a better play supervisory advantage over its resident merchants; Secondly, when implementing rewards and penalties for the "supervisees," the government regulators and the OGS platform enterprises should, according to their actual situation, adjust the fixed penalties to " Dynamic punishment, "the amount of punishment for the regulated object will be positively related to its violation rate; Finally, the regulator should implement " additional rewards and punishments " according to the specific behavioral performance of the regulated person, instead of the one-size-fits-all reward and punishment model. Under the optimized design of the regulatory mechanism of this research, the OGS market will form a new pattern of market supervision with coordinated government supervision, industry self-discipline, and active social supervision. It effectively protects the interests of all market participants and promotes the healthy development of the OGS market.

Suggested Citation

  • Yaning Miao & Yuchun Zhang, 2025. "Optimizing market supervision mechanisms for online grocery shopping with consideration of malicious consumer behavior defense," Electronic Commerce Research, Springer, vol. 25(3), pages 2389-2416, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:elcore:v:25:y:2025:i:3:d:10.1007_s10660-025-09949-3
    DOI: 10.1007/s10660-025-09949-3
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    References listed on IDEAS

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