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A network based mechanism for managing decomposable tasks via crowdsourcing

Author

Listed:
  • Sankar Kumar Mridha

    (Indian Institute of Engineering Science and Technology)

  • Malay Bhattacharyya

    (Indian Institute of Engineering Science and Technology)

Abstract

If a task is decomposable in a competitive crowdsourcing environment, thereby allowing collaboration, rational workers may choose to divide it into multiple sub-tasks among themselves. But as the winners are selected independently, there is no benefit out of this decomposition. We show that by the appropriate combination of such decomposed solutions, obtained from multiple workers, we can achieve a better solution for a given task. We present a network based mechanism to choose the best mixture of sub-tasks in a competitive environment for selecting collaborating winners.

Suggested Citation

  • Sankar Kumar Mridha & Malay Bhattacharyya, 2018. "A network based mechanism for managing decomposable tasks via crowdsourcing," Electronic Commerce Research, Springer, vol. 18(4), pages 869-881, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:elcore:v:18:y:2018:i:4:d:10.1007_s10660-018-9317-8
    DOI: 10.1007/s10660-018-9317-8
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Shuchi Chawla & Jason Hartline & David Malec & Balasubramanian Sivan, 2010. "Sequential Posted Pricing and Multi-parameter Mechanism Design," Discussion Papers 1486, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
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