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Mean-Field Game Modeling the Bandwagon Effect with Activation Costs

Author

Listed:
  • Fabio Bagagiolo

    (Università di Trento)

  • Dario Bauso

    (The University of Sheffield
    Università di Palermo)

  • Raffaele Pesenti

    (Università “Ca’Foscari” Venezia)

Abstract

This paper provides a mean-field game theoretic model of the bandwagon effect in social networks. This effect can be observed whenever individuals tend to align their own opinions to a mainstream opinion. The contribution is threefold. First, we describe the opinion propagation as a mean-field game with local interactions. Second, we establish mean-field equilibrium strategies in the case where the mainstream opinion is constant. Such strategies are shown to have a threshold structure. Third, we extend the use of threshold strategies to the case of time-varying mainstream opinion and study the evolution of the macroscopic system.

Suggested Citation

  • Fabio Bagagiolo & Dario Bauso & Raffaele Pesenti, 2016. "Mean-Field Game Modeling the Bandwagon Effect with Activation Costs," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 6(4), pages 456-476, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:dyngam:v:6:y:2016:i:4:d:10.1007_s13235-015-0167-x
    DOI: 10.1007/s13235-015-0167-x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Rainer Hegselmann & Ulrich Krause, 2002. "Opinion Dynamics and Bounded Confidence Models, Analysis and Simulation," Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, vol. 5(3), pages 1-2.
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    3. Daron Acemoğlu & Giacomo Como & Fabio Fagnani & Asuman Ozdaglar, 2013. "Opinion Fluctuations and Disagreement in Social Networks," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 38(1), pages 1-27, February.
    4. Fabio Bagagiolo & Dario Bauso, 2014. "Mean-Field Games and Dynamic Demand Management in Power Grids," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 4(2), pages 155-176, June.
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    6. A. Pluchino & V. Latora & A. Rapisarda, 2006. "Compromise and synchronization in opinion dynamics," The European Physical Journal B: Condensed Matter and Complex Systems, Springer;EDP Sciences, vol. 50(1), pages 169-176, March.
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    Cited by:

    1. Paolo Dai Pra & Elena Sartori & Marco Tolotti, 2019. "Climb on the Bandwagon: Consensus and Periodicity in a Lifetime Utility Model with Strategic Interactions," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 9(4), pages 1061-1075, December.

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