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Dynamic Games in Environmental Economics and Management

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  • Florian Wagener

    (University of Amsterdam
    Tinbergen Institute)

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  • Florian Wagener, 2022. "Dynamic Games in Environmental Economics and Management," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 12(3), pages 747-750, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:dyngam:v:12:y:2022:i:3:d:10.1007_s13235-022-00456-w
    DOI: 10.1007/s13235-022-00456-w
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Francisco Cabo & Mabel Tidball, 2022. "Cooperation in a Dynamic Setting with Asymmetric Environmental Valuation and Responsibility," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 12(3), pages 844-871, September.
    2. Charles F. Mason, 2022. "Cooperation in Dynamic Games with Asymmetric Players: The Role of Social Preferences," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 12(3), pages 977-995, September.
    3. Johannes M. Schumacher & Puduru Viswanadha Reddy & Jacob C. Engwerda, 2022. "Jump Equilibria in Public-Good Differential Games with a Single State Variable," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 12(3), pages 784-812, September.
    4. Dockner Engelbert J. & Van Long Ngo, 1993. "International Pollution Control: Cooperative versus Noncooperative Strategies," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 13-29, July.
    5. Gerard Meijden & Cees Withagen & Hassan Benchekroun, 2022. "An Oligopoly-Fringe Model with HARA Preferences," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 12(3), pages 954-976, September.
    6. Akihiko Yanase & Keita Kamei, 2022. "Dynamic Game of International Pollution Control with General Oligopolistic Equilibrium: Neary Meets Dockner and Long," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 12(3), pages 751-783, September.
    7. Javier Frutos & Víctor Gatón & Paula M. López-Pérez & Guiomar Martín-Herrán, 2022. "Investment in Cleaner Technologies in a Transboundary Pollution Dynamic Game: A Numerical Investigation," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 12(3), pages 813-843, September.
    8. René Carmona & Gökçe Dayanıklı & Mathieu Laurière, 2022. "Mean Field Models to Regulate Carbon Emissions in Electricity Production," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 12(3), pages 897-928, September.
    9. Sajad Aliakbari Sani & Olivier Bahn & Erick Delage & Rinel Foguen Tchuendom, 2022. "Robust Integration of Electric Vehicles Charging Load in Smart Grid’s Capacity Expansion Planning," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 12(3), pages 1010-1041, September.
    10. Marta Biancardi & Gianluca Iannucci & Giovanni Villani, 2022. "Groundwater Exploitation and Illegal Behaviors in a Differential Game," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 12(3), pages 996-1009, September.
    11. Ratul Lahkar & Vinay Ramani, 2021. "An Evolutionary Approach to Pollution Control in Competitive Markets," Working Papers 68, Ashoka University, Department of Economics.
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