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Wanted: A Pollution Damage Revealing Mechanism

Author

Listed:
  • Robin Hahnel

Abstract

This article proposes a theoretical, incentive compatible, pollution damage revealing mechanism to induce people to reveal how much they are damaged by environmental degradation so polluters can be charged for the amount of damage caused. The mechanism is embedded in the participatory planning procedure that is part of a theoretical alternative to capitalism known as a “participatory economy.â€

Suggested Citation

  • Robin Hahnel, 2017. "Wanted: A Pollution Damage Revealing Mechanism," Review of Radical Political Economics, Union for Radical Political Economics, vol. 49(2), pages 233-246, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:reorpe:v:49:y:2017:i:2:p:233-246
    DOI: 10.1177/0486613415608134
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Groves, Theodore & Ledyard, John O, 1977. "Optimal Allocation of Public Goods: A Solution to the "Free Rider" Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 45(4), pages 783-809, May.
    2. James K. Boyce, 2002. "The Political Economy of the Environment," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 2080.
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    6. Robin Hahnel & Kristen Sheeran, 2009. "Misinterpreting the Coase Theorem," Journal of Economic Issues, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 43(1), pages 215-238.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • P30 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Socialist Institutions and Their Transitions - - - General

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