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Promoting cocoa agroforestry under conditions of separated ownership of land and trees: Strengthening customary tenure institutions in Cameroon

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  • Jaza Folefack, Achille Jean
  • Darr, Dietrich

Abstract

Formal and customary land tenure can encourage the adoption of sustainable land management practices. Yet, certain forms of customary land tenure can deter farmers from practicing agroforestry. One such example is the case of cocoa agroforestry in the Centre region of Cameroon, where cocoa orchards and the fruit trees that grow inside were traditionally inherited separately to different family members. While customary land owners hesitate to allow tree cultivation in their cocoa orchards as they are afraid of losing out while sharing their land, the tree owners would often like to expand the number of fruit trees, but lack the land to do so. This study assessed how various policy instruments can enhance the adoption of agroforestry in this context. Using the Coase theorem, we analyzed seven agroforestry systems of cocoa in association with Safout (Dacryodes edulis), Bush mango (Irvingia gabonensis) and/or Ndjansang (Ricinodendron heudelotii). Land sharing with fruit producers reduced the cocoa mono-croppers’ farm income by 40–80%, while fruit producers benefited especially from the cultivation of Bush mango. According to our baseline Coase theorem results, cocoa agroforestry was socially efficient when 13–60 fruit trees/ha were planted, providing a positive net social benefit (248,753 to 3,394,829 FCFA/ha). The policy intervention scenarios (cocoa certification, payment from voluntary carbon projects and reform of the current customary tenure system) led to more fruit trees being planted (14–71 trees/ha) and increased the net social benefit (266,418 to 5,753,595 FCFA/ha). Both farmer categories gained in each of the scenarios, with the fruit producers benefiting more than the cocoa croppers. Among the investigated policy instruments, a land tenure reform inducing a fair revenue sharing proved to be the most effective in encouraging tree planting in cocoa farms.

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  • Jaza Folefack, Achille Jean & Darr, Dietrich, 2021. "Promoting cocoa agroforestry under conditions of separated ownership of land and trees: Strengthening customary tenure institutions in Cameroon," Land Use Policy, Elsevier, vol. 108(C).
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:lauspo:v:108:y:2021:i:c:s0264837721002477
    DOI: 10.1016/j.landusepol.2021.105524
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    1. FREDERICK MBUFOR, Eteindem & AZIBO BALGAH, Roland & NGEK SHILLIE, Peter, 2023. "Determinants Of Adoption Of Certified Cocoa Production In Meme Division, South West Region Of Cameroon," International Journal of Agriculture and Environmental Research, Malwa International Journals Publication, vol. 9(2), March.
    2. Ndip, Francis Ebai & Molua, Ernest L. & Mvodo, Meyo-Elise Stephanie & Nkendah, Robert & Djomo Choumbou, Raoul Fani & Tabetando, Rayner & Akem, Nina Fabinin, 2023. "Farmland Fragmentation, crop diversification and incomes in Cameroon, a Congo Basin country," Land Use Policy, Elsevier, vol. 130(C).
    3. Chen, Haojie & Sloggy, Matthew R. & Evans, Samuel, 2025. "How land property rights affect the effectiveness of payment for ecosystem services: A review," Land Use Policy, Elsevier, vol. 151(C).
    4. Adekola, Oluwafemi & Krigsholm, Pauliina & Riekkinen, Kirsikka, 2023. "Adapted institutional analysis and development framework for understanding customary land institutions in sub-Saharan Africa – A case study from Nigeria," Land Use Policy, Elsevier, vol. 131(C).
    5. Boris D Soh Wenda & Hugues Nken & Hubert N T. Takam & Christian E Eloundou & Dorothy E Fon, 2024. "Rainforest Alliance-UTZ cocoa certification scheme adoption: Determinants and financial implications for cocoa production in the Centre region of Cameroon," PLOS Sustainability and Transformation, Public Library of Science, vol. 3(7), pages 1-19, July.

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