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The ‘culture of honor’ in citizens’ concepts of their duty as voters

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  • Jonathan Baron

Abstract

Web studies explored citizens’ concepts of their duty as voters and their choices concerning actual policies. Some people see a moral duty to support their group (their nation) regardless of harmful effects on outsiders. One study supports the hypothesis that this duty avoids betrayal of the nation, which they see as granting the right to vote for the purpose of advancing national interest. Some also see a duty to defend their self-interest through voting; many think this is a rational way to pursue their interests. Another justification is, “If [the voter] does not look out for her own interests, nobody else will.†I hypothesize a norm of responsibility for self-defense, part of the “culture of honor†(Cohen and Nisbett, 1994) in all of us. Yet politics is by design an inefficient way to pursue self-interest, although it is efficient for advancing the good of all.

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  • Jonathan Baron, 2012. "The ‘culture of honor’ in citizens’ concepts of their duty as voters," Rationality and Society, , vol. 24(1), pages 37-72, February.
  • Handle: RePEc:sae:ratsoc:v:24:y:2012:i:1:p:37-72
    DOI: 10.1177/1043463111434703
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