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Social Identities, Ethnic Diversity, and Tax Morale


  • Sherry Xin Li

    (School of Economic, Political and Policy Sciences (EPPS), University of Texas at Dallas, Richardson, TX, USA,


This article investigates the impact of individuals’ social identities on their tax attitudes and how these effects on the micro level are translated to the impact of a country’s ethnic heterogeneity on the public’s overall tax morale. The author finds that both ethnic and national identities play important roles shaping tax morale, and these effects depend on the country’s population heterogeneity. Overall, ethnically fractionalized countries have poorer tax morale than homogeneous ones, suggesting a higher cost of tax collection for the former. This is consistent with previous findings that suggest detrimental impact of ethnic fractionalization on public sector performance.

Suggested Citation

  • Sherry Xin Li, 2010. "Social Identities, Ethnic Diversity, and Tax Morale," Public Finance Review, , vol. 38(2), pages 146-177, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:sae:pubfin:v:38:y:2010:i:2:p:146-177

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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. CALLENS Marie-Sophie, 2015. "Integration policies and public opinion: in conflict or in harmony?," LISER Working Paper Series 2015-02, LISER.
    2. Musharraf Rasool Cyan & Antonios M. Koumpias & Jorge Martinez-Vazquez, 2016. "The Effects of Media Campaigns on Individual Attitudes towards Tax Compliance; Quasi-experimental Evidence from Survey Data in Pakistan," International Center for Public Policy Working Paper Series, at AYSPS, GSU paper1609, International Center for Public Policy, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University.
    3. Amelie F. Constant & Klaus F. Zimmermann, 2013. "Immigrants, ethnic identities and the nation-state," Chapters,in: International Handbook on the Economics of Migration, chapter 14, pages 259-275 Edward Elgar Publishing.
    4. James Alm & Jeremy Clark & Kara Leibel, 2016. "Enforcement, Socioeconomic Diversity, and Tax Filing Compliance in the United States," Southern Economic Journal, Southern Economic Association, vol. 82(3), pages 725-747, January.
    5. Alessandro Belmonte & Roberto Dell'Anno & Desiree Teobaldelli, 2016. "Tax Morale, Aversion to Ethnic Diversity, and Decentralization," Working Papers 07/2016, IMT Institute for Advanced Studies Lucca, revised Dec 2016.
    6. repec:eee:soceco:v:70:y:2017:i:c:p:10-22 is not listed on IDEAS
    7. James Alm & Jeremy Clark & Kara Leibel, 2011. "Socio-economic Diversity, Social Capital, and Tax Filing Compliance in the United States," Working Papers in Economics 11/35, University of Canterbury, Department of Economics and Finance.
    8. Paolo Masella, 2013. "National identity and ethnic diversity," Journal of Population Economics, Springer;European Society for Population Economics, vol. 26(2), pages 437-454, April.
    9. Maria Paz Espinosa & Enrique Fatas & Paloma Ubeda, 2015. "Identity, language, and conflict: An experiment on ethno-linguistic diversity and group discrimination in two bilingual societies," Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Science (CBESS) 15-14, School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..


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