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Gender, sexism, and war 1

Author

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  • Dan Reiter

    (1371Emory University, USA)

  • Scott Wolford

    (12330University of Texas, USA)

Abstract

We analyze a model of leader gender and crisis bargaining under asymmetric information. There are no essential differences between the sexes in their willingness to use force, but sexist leaders receive a subjective boost for defeating female leaders in war and pay a subjective cost for defeat. We show that this hostile sexism can lead to war for two reasons, first by offering sufficient private benefits to make peace impossible and second by influencing an uninformed leader’s willingness to risk war. We also show that (a) the effect of leader sex on disputes and war depends on the distribution of power, (b) sexist leaders may initiate disputes at less favorable distributions of power than non-sexist leaders, and (c) sexist leaders adopt bargaining strategies that make it difficult for women to cultivate and benefit from reputations for resolve, even in the absence of sex differences in the willingness to use force.

Suggested Citation

  • Dan Reiter & Scott Wolford, 2022. "Gender, sexism, and war 1," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 34(1), pages 59-77, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:34:y:2022:i:1:p:59-77
    DOI: 10.1177/09516298211061151
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Scott Wolford, 2014. "Threats at Home, Threats Abroad: Bargaining and War in the Shadow of Coups and Revolutions," International Interactions, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 40(4), pages 506-532, August.
    2. Fearon, James D., 1995. "Rationalist explanations for war," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 49(3), pages 379-414, July.
    3. Alyssa K. Prorok, 2016. "Leader Incentives and Civil War Outcomes," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 60(1), pages 70-84, January.
    4. Schwartz, Joshua A. & Blair, Christopher W., 2020. "Do Women Make More Credible Threats? Gender Stereotypes, Audience Costs, and Crisis Bargaining," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 74(4), pages 872-895, October.
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    7. Tiffany D. Barnes & Diana Z. O'Brien, 2018. "Defending the Realm: The Appointment of Female Defense Ministers Worldwide," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 62(2), pages 355-368, April.
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    10. Abigail S. Post & Paromita Sen, 2020. "Why can’t a woman be more like a man? Female leaders in crisis bargaining," International Interactions, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 46(1), pages 1-27, January.
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