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International Uncertainty, Foreign Policy Flexibility, and Surplus Majority Coalitions in Israel

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  • Douglas M. Stinnett

    (Department of International Affairs University of Georgia, Athens)

Abstract

This article explains the prevalence of surplus majority government coalitions in Israel as a result of the interaction between international uncertainty and the need to preserve both government stability and latitude in the conduct of foreign policy. I develop a game-theoretic model of government formation in which the international environment is a source of uncertainty for the policy preferences of the prime minister. The model predicts that when uncertainty is high enough, it is optimal for the prime minister to establish an oversized coalition government. By including expendable parties in a government, the prime minister has greater freedom to modify foreign policy in response to the international environment without jeopardizing majority status in parliament. The logic of the model is analyzed through two case studies: Menachem Begin, 1977-1981, and Ehud Barak, 1999-2000. The findings of the model have larger theoretical implications for the connection between domestic politics and international relations.

Suggested Citation

  • Douglas M. Stinnett, 2007. "International Uncertainty, Foreign Policy Flexibility, and Surplus Majority Coalitions in Israel," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 51(3), pages 470-495, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jocore:v:51:y:2007:i:3:p:470-495
    DOI: 10.1177/0022002707300183
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    References listed on IDEAS

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