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Conflict and Limits of Power

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  • Nozomu Matsubara

    (University of Tokyo)

Abstract

Since Dahl's definition, every effort to measure power has aimed simultaneously to conceptualize and to substantiate the meaning of power. However, there is a substantial lack of rigorous and concrete models of power as a basis to discuss various characteristics of power in international politics. In this model, the “limit of power†is defined and measured. Axelrod's model of a “bully†suggests a prototype of power seeker, but Rapoport and Chammah's empirical data on intrinsic defection probability play the critical role in making it measurable in Dahl's sense. The distribution of power as related to Axelrod's conflict of interest is neither directly nor inversely proportional to C.I.. Three phases of C.I.—mild, moderate, and severe—are shown to characterize three important types of international political and political economy systems: alliance, interdependence, and bipolarity, respectively. Other important characteristics of power are formulated, as the rate of collective goods consumed, credibility, the acquisitive and punitive efficacies of power, and characteristics of the limit of power are reviewed in comparison with the Shapley-Shubik power index.

Suggested Citation

  • Nozomu Matsubara, 1989. "Conflict and Limits of Power," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 33(1), pages 113-141, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:sae:jocore:v:33:y:1989:i:1:p:113-141
    DOI: 10.1177/0022002789033001005
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    References listed on IDEAS

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