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A Game Theoretic Analysis of Olson's Game of Collective Action

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  • Norman Schofield

    (Department of Government University of Essex)

Abstract

Olson has argued that rational, self-interested individuals will not act to achieve their common goal or to satisfy their collective interests. Hardin interpreted the argument in terms of the classical prisoner's dilemma and offered a solution whereby the majority choice of the group would rationally be the joint cooperative strategy. The present paper considers the characteristic function of such a game and demonstrates that, within the terms of reference of game theory, there exists a solution in the sense that any coalition beyond a certain size must unanimously and rationally grow until it becomes the grand coalition. In other words the solution supposes that subgroups form within the primary group and considers the consequent, rational dynamics of the situation.

Suggested Citation

  • Norman Schofield, 1975. "A Game Theoretic Analysis of Olson's Game of Collective Action," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 19(3), pages 441-461, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jocore:v:19:y:1975:i:3:p:441-461
    DOI: 10.1177/002200277501900303
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Ellickson, Bryan, 1973. "A Generalization of the Pure Theory of Public Goods," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 63(3), pages 417-432, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Joe Oppenheimer, 1985. "Public choice and three ethical properties of politics," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 45(3), pages 241-255, January.
    2. Nozomu Matsubara, 1989. "Conflict and Limits of Power," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 33(1), pages 113-141, March.
    3. Norman Schofield, 1977. "Dynamic games of collective action," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 30(1), pages 77-105, June.
    4. Pamela Oliver, 1980. "Selective Incentives in an Apex Game," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 24(1), pages 113-141, March.
    5. Norman Schofield, 1980. "Formal political theory," Quality & Quantity: International Journal of Methodology, Springer, vol. 14(1), pages 249-275, January.
    6. Hannu Nurmi, 1977. "Ways out of the Prisoner's Dilemma," Quality & Quantity: International Journal of Methodology, Springer, vol. 11(2), pages 135-165, June.
    7. Davis B. Bobrow & Robert T. Kudrle, 1976. "Theory, Policy, and Resource Cartels," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 20(1), pages 3-56, March.
    8. Pamela Oliver, 1984. "Rewards and Punishments as Selective Incentives," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 28(1), pages 123-148, March.
    9. Samuel S. Komorita & C. William Lapworth, 1982. "Alternative Choices in Social Dilemmas," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 26(4), pages 692-708, December.

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