A note on exogenous changes in incentives for and deterrence of corruption
Download full text from publisher
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.
References listed on IDEAS
- Lorenzo Pellegrini & Reyer Gerlagh, 2004. "Corruption's Effect on Growth and its Transmission Channels," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 57(3), pages 429-456, August.
- repec:cup:cbooks:9780521659123 is not listed on IDEAS
- Thierry Verdier & Daron Acemoglu, 2000. "The Choice between Market Failures and Corruption," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(1), pages 194-211, March.
- Ellickson, Bryan, 1973. "A Generalization of the Pure Theory of Public Goods," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 63(3), pages 417-432, June.
- Mo, Pak Hung, 2001. "Corruption and Economic Growth," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(1), pages 66-79, March.
- Del Monte, Alfredo & Papagni, Erasmo, 2001. "Public expenditure, corruption, and economic growth: the case of Italy," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 17(1), pages 1-16, March.
- Shouyong Shi & Ted Temzelides, 2004. "A Model Of Bureaucracy And Corruption," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 45(3), pages 873-908, August.
- Besley, Timothy & McLaren, John, 1993. "Taxes and Bribery: The Role of Wage Incentives," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 103(416), pages 119-141, January.
- Axel Dreher & Thomas Herzfeld, 2005. "The Economic Costs of Corruption: A Survey and New Evidence," Public Economics 0506001, EconWPA.
- Paolo Mauro, 1995. "Corruption and Growth," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 110(3), pages 681-712.
- repec:cup:cbooks:9780521632935 is not listed on IDEAS
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- A. Antoci & S. Borghesi & G. Iannucci, 2016.
"Green licenses and environmental corruption: a random matching model,"
Working Paper CRENoS
201615, Centre for North South Economic Research, University of Cagliari and Sassari, Sardinia.
- Angelo Antoci & Simone Borghesi & Gianluca Iannucci, 2016. "Green licenses and environmental corruption: a random matching model," SEEDS Working Papers 1116, SEEDS, Sustainability Environmental Economics and Dynamics Studies, revised Nov 2016.
More about this item
KeywordsBureaucrats; Corruption; Government failure; Incentives; Market failure; Public goods; K13; D23; H41;
- K13 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Tort Law and Product Liability; Forensic Economics
- D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
- H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
StatisticsAccess and download statistics
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:ejlwec:v:24:y:2007:i:1:p:15-27. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Sonal Shukla) or (Rebekah McClure). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .