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A Model Of Bureaucracy And Corruption


  • Shouyong Shi
  • Ted Temzelides


We analyze bureaucracy and corruption in a market with decentralized exchange and "lemons." Exchange is modeled as a sequence of bilateral, random matches. Agents have private information about the quality of goods they produce and can supplement trade with socially inefficient bribes. Bureaucracy is modeled as a group of agents who enjoy centralized production and consumption. Transaction patterns between the bureaucracy and the private sector are fully endogenous. Centralized production and consumption in the bureaucracy give rise to low power incentives for the individual bureaucrats. As a result, private agents might bribe bureaucrats, whereas they do not bribe each other. An equilibrium with corruption and an equilibrium without corruption can coexist. We discuss some welfare implications of the model. Copyright 2004 by the Economics Department Of The University Of Pennsylvania And Osaka University Institute Of Social And Economic Research Association.

Suggested Citation

  • Shouyong Shi & Ted Temzelides, 2004. "A Model Of Bureaucracy And Corruption," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 45(3), pages 873-908, August.
  • Handle: RePEc:ier:iecrev:v:45:y:2004:i:3:p:873-908

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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Davide Infante & Janna Smirnova, 2010. "Market Failures within Poor Institutions: The Effects of Bureaucrats’ Rent-seeking Activity," Chapters,in: Institutional and Social Dynamics of Growth and Distribution, chapter 5 Edward Elgar Publishing.
    2. Giuseppe Di Vita, 2006. "Corruption, Exogenous Changes in Incentives and Deterrence," Working Papers 2006.16, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    3. Giuseppe Vita, 2007. "A note on exogenous changes in incentives for and deterrence of corruption," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 24(1), pages 15-27, August.
    4. Antonio Merlo, 2004. "Introduction To Economic Models Of Crime," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 45(3), pages 677-679, August.
    5. repec:eur:ejesjr:178 is not listed on IDEAS

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