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Power, Uncertainty, and the Onset of International Violence

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  • Manus I. Midlarsky

    (Department of Political Science and Institute of Behavioral Science University of Colorado)

Abstract

This study suggests a particular conceptualization of power for purposes of explaining the onset of international warfare. Power is here understood as a capability to effect a reduction of environmental uncertainty, while the exercise of power for the benefit of an actor is the actual reduction of that uncertainty. Eight types of power configuration are specified, including, among others, control, subservience, constraint, and inversion. The conditions of power loss in alliance systems and power constraint in the form of geographical frontiers are found to be related to the frequency of war for central power nations. An alternative approach stemming from theories of international stability yields the same functional relationship as does the initial power framework. Additionally, a logarithmic relationship is found between the number of international poles existing in the period 1815-1945 and the frequency of war. Policy implications are derived relative to alliance-formation and responses to the emergence of new polar actors.

Suggested Citation

  • Manus I. Midlarsky, 1974. "Power, Uncertainty, and the Onset of International Violence," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 18(3), pages 395-431, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jocore:v:18:y:1974:i:3:p:395-431
    DOI: 10.1177/002200277401800303
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Singer, J. David, 1963. "Inter-Nation Influence: A Formal Model," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 57(2), pages 420-430, June.
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    4. Shapley, L. S. & Shubik, Martin, 1954. "A Method for Evaluating the Distribution of Power in a Committee System," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 48(3), pages 787-792, September.
    5. Haas, Michael, 1970. "International Subsystems: Stability and Polarity," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 64(1), pages 98-123, March.
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