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Why Poor People Do Not Move: Job Search Behavior and Disequilibrium Amongst Local Labor Markets

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  • G L Clark
  • J Whiteman

Abstract

A model of why people do not move between local labor markets is developed by means of a set of concepts derived from the job search and contracts literature. Emphasis is placed on how the environment, in which individuals behave, determines outcomes. It is argued that individuals act rationally, but that in a world of inequality rational behavior can reinforce disequilibrium and the perpetuation of spatial-economic inequality. A hypothetical example of two local labor markets is used to illustrate our argument.

Suggested Citation

  • G L Clark & J Whiteman, 1983. "Why Poor People Do Not Move: Job Search Behavior and Disequilibrium Amongst Local Labor Markets," Environment and Planning A, , vol. 15(1), pages 85-104, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:envira:v:15:y:1983:i:1:p:85-104
    DOI: 10.1068/a150085
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Schultz, Theodore W, 1980. "Nobel Lecture: The Economics of Being Poor," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 88(4), pages 639-651, August.
    2. Martin Neil Baily, 1974. "Wages and Employment under Uncertain Demand," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 41(1), pages 37-50.
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