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The Productivity Commission and industrial relations reform

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  • David Peetz

Abstract

This article considers the political economy of the Productivity Commission in industrial relations reform; in particular, its review of the industrial relations framework foreshadowed in 2013 and conducted in 2015. Following a history of the establishment of the Productivity Commission and its predecessor agencies, it argues that the concepts of third-party independence and third-party endorsement are important for understanding the role of the Productivity Commission. A review of the politics of industrial relations reform leads into the central analysis of the political economy of the Productivity Commission’s 2015 inquiry into the Australian workplace relations framework. The concepts of third-party independence and endorsement are applied in analysing some of the inquiry’s key recommendations. The conclusion discusses several difficulties in the political economy of the Productivity Commission and its relationships to government and, indeed, to evidence, when the latter contradicted its mainly liberal market stance.

Suggested Citation

  • David Peetz, 2016. "The Productivity Commission and industrial relations reform," The Economic and Labour Relations Review, , vol. 27(2), pages 164-180, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:ecolab:v:27:y:2016:i:2:p:164-180
    DOI: 10.1177/1035304616649305
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Barbara Pocock, 2016. "Holding up half the sky? Women at work in the 21st century," The Economic and Labour Relations Review, , vol. 27(2), pages 147-163, June.
    2. Productivity Commission, 2009. "Executive Remuneration in Australia," Inquiry Reports, Productivity Commission, Government of Australia, number 49.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Construction industry employment relations; employment relations reform; independent third party policy agencies; industrial relations framework; market liberalism; penalty rates; Productivity Commission; third-party endorsement;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • J51 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - Trade Unions: Objectives, Structure, and Effects
    • J53 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - Labor-Management Relations; Industrial Jurisprudence
    • J58 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - Public Policy

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