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What matters to people when we sanction states? A conjoint experiment

Author

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  • Jaroslaw Kantorowicz
  • Elena Kantorowicz-Reznichenko

Abstract

We investigate how to design sanction regimes that enhance public support for sanctions in the sending countries. To this end, we conduct a conjoint experiment on quota samples in Poland and Germany, using the context of sanctions on Russia. We find that support for sanctions decreases as domestic costs increase. However, support can be bolstered through aid programs that mitigate these costs and through beneficial policy alternatives. Furthermore, we show that support for sanctions rises when the costs imposed on the target state increase and when the sanctioning coalition expands.

Suggested Citation

  • Jaroslaw Kantorowicz & Elena Kantorowicz-Reznichenko, 2026. "What matters to people when we sanction states? A conjoint experiment," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 43(2), pages 209-222, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:compsc:v:43:y:2026:i:2:p:209-222
    DOI: 10.1177/07388942251334955
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    References listed on IDEAS

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