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Alliances, state preferences, and trade networks: The impact of United States sanctions on dual-use trade

Author

Listed:
  • Yuleng Zeng

    (3647University of Groningen, Netherlands)

  • Timothy Peterson

    (7864Arizona State University, USA)

Abstract

Export controls on dual-use commodities are crucial to US foreign policy goals. Research finds that US sanctions motivate third-party compliance with export controls. However, the sanctions-busting literature suggests that allies are more likely than non-allies to sabotage US sanctioning efforts. We argue that US allies export more controlled dual-use goods (CDU) when the importer is not facing US sanctions. However, US allies will not export more CDU than non-allies to US-sanctioned states. We also argue that US sanctions condition the impact of economic and political determinants of CDU trade. We find support in models spanning 1997–2015.

Suggested Citation

  • Yuleng Zeng & Timothy Peterson, 2025. "Alliances, state preferences, and trade networks: The impact of United States sanctions on dual-use trade," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 42(6), pages 624-644, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:compsc:v:42:y:2025:i:6:p:624-644
    DOI: 10.1177/07388942241298496
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    References listed on IDEAS

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