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Public Procurement Efficiency In Agriculture And Forestry In Slovakia

Author

Listed:
  • Beata GAVUROVA

    (Technical University of Kosice; Nemcovej 32, 040 01 Kosice; Slovak Republic)

  • David TUCEK

    (Tomas Bata University in Zlin; Nam. T. G. Masaryka 5555; Zlin; Czech Republic)

  • Andrea TKACOVA

    (Technical University of Kosice; Nemcovej 32, 040 01 Kosice; Slovak Republic)

  • Jakub DANKO

    (Technical University of Kosice; Nemcovej 32, 040 01 Kosice; Slovak Republic)

Abstract

Agriculture and forestry in Slovakia is a sector that includes the highest number of contract awards in public procurement. The main aim of this article is to identify an influence of selected determinants on public procurement efficiency in agricultural and forestry sector in Slovakia. There are created two basic types of models based on a sample of 291 contracts, which were formed by means of a multiple linear regression in program R. The first model examines an influence of variables on public procurement savings that is defined as a rate of the final and probable price of the contract. This model confirms a positive influence of a number of offers on savings’ formation, where each next offer increases saving of approximately 8.816 %. On the other hand, a subcontractor’s presence reduces saving by 19.9 %. The second model examines and influence of variables on a number of offers in public procurement. The number of offers in a given sector positively influences a public competition, while there is usually of three offers more than in the negotiating process. However, the number of offers decreases when a contract is financing from the EU funds and when contract specifies a criterion of quality.

Suggested Citation

  • Beata GAVUROVA & David TUCEK & Andrea TKACOVA & Jakub DANKO, 2018. "Public Procurement Efficiency In Agriculture And Forestry In Slovakia," REVISTA ADMINISTRATIE SI MANAGEMENT PUBLIC, Faculty of Administration and Public Management, Academy of Economic Studies, Bucharest, Romania, vol. 2018(30), pages 24-36, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:rom:rampas:v:2018:y:2018:i:30:p:24-36
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Baldwin, Laura H & Marshall, Robert C & Richard, Jean-Francois, 1997. "Bidder Collusion at Forest Service Timber Sales," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(4), pages 657-699, August.
    2. Ido Millet & Diane H. Parente & John L. Fizel & Ray R. Venkataraman, 2004. "Metrics for Managing Online Procurement Auctions," Interfaces, INFORMS, vol. 34(3), pages 171-179, June.
    3. Daniel Rondeau & Pascal Courty & Maurice Doyon, 2016. "Simultaneous Allocation of Bundled Goods through Auctions: Assessing the Case for Joint Bidding," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 98(3), pages 838-859.
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    Cited by:

    1. Beata GAVUROVA & David TUCEK & Viliam KOVAC, 2019. "Economic Aspects Of Public Procurement Parameters In Tertiary Education Sector," REVISTA ADMINISTRATIE SI MANAGEMENT PUBLIC, Faculty of Administration and Public Management, Academy of Economic Studies, Bucharest, Romania, vol. 2019(32), pages 42-62, June.
    2. Beata GAVUROVA & Martin MIKESKA & Eva HUCULOVA, 2020. "Evaluation Of Selected Determinants Of Public Procurement In The Health Sector," REVISTA ADMINISTRATIE SI MANAGEMENT PUBLIC, Faculty of Administration and Public Management, Academy of Economic Studies, Bucharest, Romania, vol. 2020(34), pages 45-63, June.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • H40 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - General
    • H54 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Infrastructures
    • Q14 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Agriculture - - - Agricultural Finance
    • Q18 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Agriculture - - - Agricultural Policy; Food Policy; Animal Welfare Policy

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