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Behavioral Antitrust
[Поведенческий Антитраст]

Author

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  • Shastitko, Anastasia (Шаститко, Анастасия)

    (Lomonosov Moscow State University)

Abstract

Purpose - to identify the grounds for the application of behavioral economics to antitrust policy. The analysis of the potential and limitations of behavioral economics for the purposes of anti-monopoly regulation. The main conclusion: the crisis of existing theories, which are based on competition policy, the emergence of new types of markets and new ways of restriction of competition and the development of alternative theories themselves forced to look for new ways to improve antitrust policy. One such way - using principles of behavioral economics, if not as the main theory, determines the direction of changes in antitrust laws and the mechanisms of its application, that as one of the key supporting theories.

Suggested Citation

  • Shastitko, Anastasia (Шаститко, Анастасия), 2014. "Behavioral Antitrust [Поведенческий Антитраст]," Ekonomicheskaya Politika / Economic Policy, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration, vol. 6, pages 76-91, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:rnp:ecopol:ep1468
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    References listed on IDEAS

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