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La politique monétaire canadienne : entre l’arbre, l’écorce et la forêt

  • Racette, Daniel

    (Institut d’économie appliquée, École des Hautes Études Commerciales)

  • Raynauld, Jacques

    (Institut d’économie appliquée, École des Hautes Études Commerciales)

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    Starting in 1988, the Bank of Canada has adopted price stability as its sole long-run objective. In this paper, we critically assess the policy actions effectively undertaken in light of this objective. Instead of using the so-called monetary conditions (interest rates and the exchange rate), we base our analysis on the movements of indicators closely related to true policy actions. Our results show a clear dichotomy between the long-run objective and the short-run policy actions. For example, while some policy analysts have identified a restrictive monetary stance in 1989, we detect rather expansionnist or at best neutral policy actions. We argue that the Bank of Canada's delay in meeting its long-run objective can be attributed to the discretionary framework under which its policy is conducted. This may undermine in the long run the Bank's credibility in its fight against inflation. Depuis quelques années, la Banque du Canada a adopté un objectif ferme de stabilité des prix. Dans ce texte, nous caractérisons les gestes de politique véritablement posés par la Banque en regard de son objectif. Contrairement aux analyses habituelles qui se concentrent sur l’évolution des conditions sur les marchés financiers et de change, nous insistons sur des indicateurs systématiquement liés aux actions de la politique monétaire. Nos résultats indiquent une forme d’antinomie entre l’objectif de long terme et les actions posées dans une perspective de court terme. Par exemple, alors que plusieurs observateurs ont qualifié la politique de très restrictive en 1989, nous décelons plutôt une prédominance de gestes expansionnistes ou, au mieux, neutres. Ces contradictions entre les gestes posés dans un cadre discrétionnaire, les déclarations de la Banque et son objectif de long terme peuvent, à la longue, entacher la crédibilité de la Banque et ainsi être responsables des retards dans l’atteinte de l’objectif de stabilité des prix.

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    Article provided by Société Canadienne de Science Economique in its journal L'Actualité économique.

    Volume (Year): 67 (1991)
    Issue (Month): 3 (septembre)
    Pages: 381-399

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    Handle: RePEc:ris:actuec:v:67:y:1991:i:3:p:381-399
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    1. Mccallum, Bennet T., 1988. "Robustness properties of a rule for monetary policy," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 29(1), pages 173-203, January.
    2. N. Gregory Mankiw, 1990. "A Quick Refresher Course in Macroeconomics," NBER Working Papers 3256, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1977. "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 473-91, June.
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