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Modelo de manadas y aprendizaje social

  • Juan Pablo Herrera


    (Universidad Externado de Colombia)

  • Francisco Lozano Gerena


    (Universidad Nacional de Colombia)

One of the most frequent questions asked by economists is how individual members of societies make choices. It can be observed that economic agents imitate other agents’ actions. It should be asked why rational people choose to imitate other’s behaviour and make decisions that are not based on their own private information. Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch (1992) showed that fully rational agents, who understand the history of decision making, can generate this kind of behaviour. An important feature of this model is that once individuals begin to imitate others, the social learning process is halted. This paper shows that social learning occurs if agents have a continuum set of actions to choose from or if they just have a sample of the history. It also shows that this type of learning can occur within a herd.

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Article provided by Universidad Externado de Colombia - Facultad de Economía in its journal Revista de Economía Institucional.

Volume (Year): 7 (2005)
Issue (Month): 13 (July-December)
Pages: 133-157

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Handle: RePEc:rei:ecoins:v:7:y:2005:i:13:p:133-157
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  1. Steffen Huck & Joerg Oechssler, 1999. "Informational cascades in the laboratory: Do they occur for the right reasons?," Experimental 9901001, EconWPA.
  2. Anderson, Lisa R & Holt, Charles A, 1997. "Information Cascades in the Laboratory," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 87(5), pages 847-62, December.
  3. Salop, Steven C, 1987. "Evaluating Uncertain Evidence with Sir Thomas Bayes: A Note for Teachers," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 1(1), pages 155-59, Summer.
  4. Sushil Bikhchandani & David Hirshleifer & Ivo Welch, 2010. "A theory of Fads, Fashion, Custom and cultural change as informational Cascades," Levine's Working Paper Archive 1193, David K. Levine.
  5. Smith, L. & Sorensen, P., 1996. "Pathological Outcomes of Observational Learning," Working papers 96-19, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  6. Abhijit Banerjee & Drew Fudenberg, 2010. "Word of Mouth Learning," Levine's Working Paper Archive 723, David K. Levine.
  7. Simon, Herbert A, 1978. "Rationality as Process and as Product of Thought," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 68(2), pages 1-16, May.
  8. Luthans, Fred, 1973. "The contingency theory of management : A path out of the jungle," Business Horizons, Elsevier, vol. 16(3), pages 67-72, June.
  9. Xavier Vives, 1993. "How Fast do Rational Agents Learn?," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 60(2), pages 329-347.
  10. Prendergast, Canice & Stole, Lars, 1996. "Impetuous Youngsters and Jaded Old-Timers: Acquiring a Reputation for Learning," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 104(6), pages 1105-34, December.
  11. Charles A. Holt & Lisa R. Anderson, 1996. "Classroom Games: Understanding Bayes' Rule," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 10(2), pages 179-187, Spring.
  12. Abhijit V. Banerjee, 1992. "A Simple Model of Herd Behavior," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 107(3), pages 797-817.
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