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About Market Structure

  • Klaus Kultti

    (University of Helsinki)

I study an economy where sellers choose locations, and buyers choose which location to visit. All sellers in one location correspond to the Walrasian market while each seller in a separate location corresponds to the standard random matching model. Trades are consummated in auctions, and it turns out that the Walrasian market is not an equilibrium market structure. Rather, the sellers choose to distribute themselves in several locations endogenously creating the imperfectness of markets. I determine the number of sellers per location in equilibrium as a function of the ratio of buyers to sellers. (Copyright: Elsevier)

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Article provided by Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics in its journal Review of Economic Dynamics.

Volume (Year): 6 (2003)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
Pages: 240-251

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Handle: RePEc:red:issued:v:6:y:2003:i:1:p:240-251
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  1. Julien, Benoit & Kennes, John & King, Ian, 2000. "Matching Foundations," Working Papers 189, Department of Economics, The University of Auckland.
  2. Michael Peters, 1999. "Competition among mechanism designers in a common value environment," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 4(3), pages 273-292.
  3. Lu, Xiaohua & McAfee, R. Preston, 1996. "The Evolutionary Stability of Auctions over Bargaining," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 15(2), pages 228-254, August.
  4. Herreiner, Dorothea K, 1999. "The Decision to Seek or to Be Sought," Discussion Paper Serie B 462, University of Bonn, Germany.
  5. Kiyotaki, Nobuhiro & Wright, Randall, 1993. "A Search-Theoretic Approach to Monetary Economics," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(1), pages 63-77, March.
  6. Kultti, K.K., 1997. "Equivalence of Auctions and Posted Prices," Discussion Paper 1997-57, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  7. repec:oup:qjecon:v:105:y:1990:i:2:p:285-319 is not listed on IDEAS
  8. Ricardo Lagos, 2000. "An Alternative Approach to Search Frictions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 108(5), pages 851-873, October.
  9. Jansen, Marcel, 2010. "Job auctions and hold-ups," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(3), pages 608-619, June.
  10. Melvyn G. Coles & Jan Eeckhout, 2000. "Heterogeneity as a coordination device," Economics Working Papers 510, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
  11. repec:oup:qjecon:v:112:y:1997:i:1:p:141-68 is not listed on IDEAS
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