About Market Structure
I study an economy where sellers choose locations, and buyers choose which location to visit. All sellers in one location correspond to the Walrasian market while each seller in a separate location corresponds to the standard random matching model. Trades are consummated in auctions, and it turns out that the Walrasian market is not an equilibrium market structure. Rather, the sellers choose to distribute themselves in several locations endogenously creating the imperfectness of markets. I determine the number of sellers per location in equilibrium as a function of the ratio of buyers to sellers. (Copyright: Elsevier)
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Volume (Year): 6 (2003)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Lu, Xiaohua & McAfee, R. Preston, 1996. "The Evolutionary Stability of Auctions over Bargaining," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 15(2), pages 228-254, August.
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"Competition Among Mechanism Designers in a Common Value Environment,"
peters-96-01, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
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- Peter Diamond, 1990. "Pairwise Credit in Search Equilibrium," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 105(2), pages 285-319.
- Herreiner, Dorothea K, 1999. "The Decision to Seek or to Be Sought," Discussion Paper Serie B 462, University of Bonn, Germany.
- Ricardo Lagos, 2000. "An Alternative Approach to Search Frictions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 108(5), pages 851-873, October.
- Kultti, Klaus, 1999.
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- Julien, Benoit & Kennes, John & King, Ian, 2000. "Matching Foundations," Working Papers 189, Department of Economics, The University of Auckland.
- Kiyotaki, Nobuhiro & Wright, Randall, 1993. "A Search-Theoretic Approach to Monetary Economics," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(1), pages 63-77, March.
- Jansen, Marcel, 2010. "Job auctions and hold-ups," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(3), pages 608-619, June.
- Melvyn G. Coles & Jan Eeckhout, 2000. "Heterogeneity as a coordination device," Economics Working Papers 510, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
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