About Market Structure
I study an economy where sellers choose locations, and buyers choose which location to visit. All sellers in one location correspond to the Walrasian market while each seller in a separate location corresponds to the standard random matching model. Trades are consummated in auctions, and it turns out that the Walrasian market is not an equilibrium market structure. Rather, the sellers choose to distribute themselves in several locations endogenously creating the imperfectness of markets. I determine the number of sellers per location in equilibrium as a function of the ratio of buyers to sellers. (Copyright: Elsevier)
Volume (Year): 6 (2003)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Marina Azzimonti, Department of Economics, Stonybrook University, 10 Nicolls Road, Stonybrook NY 11790 USA|
Web page: http://www.EconomicDynamics.org/red/
More information through EDIRC
|Order Information:|| Web: https://www.economicdynamics.org/subscription-information/ Email: |
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Lu, Xiaohua & McAfee, R. Preston, 1996. "The Evolutionary Stability of Auctions over Bargaining," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 15(2), pages 228-254, August.
- Ricardo Lagos, 2000. "An Alternative Approach to Search Frictions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 108(5), pages 851-873, October.
- Kultti, K.K., 1997.
"Equivalence of Auctions and Posted Prices,"
1997-57, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Peter Diamond, 1990. "Pairwise Credit in Search Equilibrium," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 105(2), pages 285-319.
- Jansen, Marcel, 2010. "Job auctions and hold-ups," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(3), pages 608-619, June.
- Michael Peters, 1996.
"Competition Among Mechanism Designers in a Common Value Environment,"
peters-96-01, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
- Michael Peters, 1999. "Competition among mechanism designers in a common value environment," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 4(3), pages 273-292.
- Kiyotaki, Nobuhiro & Wright, Randall, 1993. "A Search-Theoretic Approach to Monetary Economics," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(1), pages 63-77, March.
- Julien, Benoit & Kennes, John & King, Ian, 2000. "Matching Foundations," Working Papers 189, Department of Economics, The University of Auckland.
- Melvyn G. Coles & Jan Eeckhout, 2000. "Heterogeneity as a coordination device," Economics Working Papers 510, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
- Herreiner, Dorothea K, 1999. "The Decision to Seek or to Be Sought," Discussion Paper Serie B 462, University of Bonn, Germany.
- Ken Burdett & Melvyn G. Coles, 1997. "Marriage and Class," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 112(1), pages 141-168.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:red:issued:v:6:y:2003:i:1:p:240-251. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Christian Zimmermann)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.